וַיֹּאמֶר֩ דָּוִ֨ד אֶל־אַבְנֵ֜ר הֲלוֹא־אִ֣ישׁ אַתָּ֗ה וּמִ֤י כָמ֙וֹךָ֙ בְּיִשְׂרָאֵ֔ל וְלָ֙מָּה֙ לֹ֣א שָׁמַ֔רְתָּ אֶל־אֲדֹנֶ֖יךָ הַמֶּ֑לֶךְ כִּי־בָא֙ אַחַ֣ד הָעָ֔ם לְהַשְׁחִ֖ית אֶת־הַמֶּ֥לֶךְ אֲדֹנֶֽיךָ׃
And David answered Abner, “You are a man, aren’t you?* And there is no one like you in Israel! So why didn’t you keep watch over your lord the king? For one of [our] troops came to do violence to your lord the king.
*Or “Aren’t you the one [I hailed]?”
(The above rendering comes from the RJPS translation, an adaptation of the NJPS translation. Before accounting for the footnoted rendering, I will analyze the plain sense of the Hebrew term containing אִישׁ, by employing a situation-oriented construal as outlined in this document, pp. 11–16.)
This verbless clause is a longstanding interpretive crux. Before discussing the main scholarly disagreement, let me first note that all observers appear to agree that David is not simply classifying the referent of the pronoun אַתָּה. In English, that matter-of-fact reading would correspond to a lowering of intonation on the predicate when stated aloud: “You are a man.” Such a construal here would not only yield an uninformative text but also be at odds with this pronoun’s conjunctive accent and its stressed syllable. (In classifying usages, the prior accent is instead disjunctive, and the pronoun’s accent shifts back; see 2 Sam 16:8; 1 Kgs 1:42; 2:9, 26.)
Lexicographers also universally construe the clause as having what scholars nowadays call a predicate focus construction. That is, the predicate אִישׁ is marked by its being preposed, to assert the nature of the subject-topic אַתָּה against a more normal possibility, much like Gen 42:9 מְרַגְּלִ֣ים אַתֶּ֔ם ‘You are actually spies’ (Biblical Hebrew Reference Grammar §47.3.2.(1)a [2017:509–510]). Other examples with a fronted predicate (or predicate complement) include Josh 17:17 עַם־רַ֣ב אַתָּ֗ה ‘you are indeed a numerous people’ and Exod 4:25 כִּ֧י חֲתַן־דָּמִ֛ים אַתָּ֖ה לִֽי ‘you are truly a bridegroom of blood for me’. An English equivalent would be: “Aren’t you a man [rather than a mouse]?”—with prosodic stress (higher intonation) on the predicated nature. This explains the glosses by most lexicographers since Simonis (1756) that understand the issue to be one of manliness, such as viro strenuo et forti ‘a vigorous and brave man’—Simonis and Winer 1828:53, §a), or this instance’s entry under a rubric such as in TLOT: “specifically characterizes typical masc. properties such as strength, influence, courage” (Kühlewein 1997a:100, §2b).
A competing classic interpretation likewise presupposes a focus-predicate construction, but understands the predicated term אִישׁ as denoting some kind of high status or leadership position. Most lexicographers from Ibn Janaḥ (11th c.) through Forster (1557) supported this construal, including: ראש ונשיא ‘chief and leader’ (Ibn Janaḥ 1893); גדול ‘eminent’ (Kimḥi 1847); ראש הגדוד ואדון החיל ושׂר הצבא ‘military commander’ (Bedersi 1865); and מצוין והחשוב ‘distinguished and important’ (Fuenn 1887). Even Forster (who prided himself on independence from rabbinic influence) classified this instance under the usage rubric of ad res gerendum publicas, idoneus est, et adhi betur, inter´que honoratiores cõnumeratur ‘used for the conduct of public affairs, and for those who are counted among the respected’. In a slightly different vein, Tedeschi (1879) features this verse as his sole proof text in the characterization of anyone designated as אִישׁ as being an impactful man, namely: ועל יד מעלליו נודע שישנו בעולם ‘by his exploits it is made known that he exists in the world’.
More recently, in her studies of the discourse particle הֲלוֹא, Adina Moshavi likewise seems to perceive a predicate focus construction. She describes this clause as a justification that is uttered in support of the accusational question that follows (2011:100n36). As such, it points to a circumstance that makes out the addressee’s conduct to be improper (2007:178), introduced by a presentative particle. I.e., “Look, you are a man—[and therefore…]” And in this respect, it is similar to 2 Sam 11:10: הֲל֤וֹא מִדֶּ֙רֶךְ֙ אַתָּ֣ה בָ֔א מַדּ֖וּעַ לֹֽא־יָרַ֥דְתָּ אֶל־בֵּיתֶֽךָ׃ ‘Look, you just got back from traveling; why don’t you go on home?’)
Unfortunately, however, a predicate focus—and therefore the foregoing interpretations—yields an incoherent text, in that David’s turn of the dialogue is disconnected from what precedes it. It is as if David simply ignores Abner’s question מִ֥י אַתָּ֖ה קָרָ֥אתָ אֶל־הַמֶּֽלֶךְ ‘Who are you to shout at the king?’ That is, Abner’s (perhaps willful) misunderstanding as to who is actually being addressed is left hanging, without being corrected by David. Instead, David ostensibly proceeds to launch into his indictment.
Another problem with the particular notion that David is pointing to a manly ideal is that it is tenuously connected from David proceeds to say. Manliness is not germane to David’s subsequent complaint about Abner’s inattentiveness or competence. (What evidence is there that in ancient Israel, manliness was equated with those qualities? On the contrary, only men in certain positions of responsibility were required to be attentive.)
Fortunately, if we adopt a situation-oriented construal of אִישׁ, then both coherence problems disappear. The key to interpretation is to recognize what is truly at issue as David opens his mouth to speak. The implicit issue under discussion is: To whom am I, David, addressing myself? In other words, what is the immediate situation—who exactly is the intended participant in my discourse? Given both that אִישׁ is the Hebrew language’s default vocabulary for discussing participation in a situation, and that the very mention of אִישׁ evokes the situation in question, it is the most efficient—and therefore the most natural—term for David to employ as he clarifies which אִישׁ is his intended interlocutor.
(For a banner example of a two-party framework in which the other party is labeled in situational terms as אִישׁ, see the phrase עֶבֶד אִישׁ, Exod 12:44. See also 22:6 [2nd instance]; Lev 7:8; 19:20 [2nd instance]; 20:10 [2nd instance]; Num 5:8; 21:9; Deut 1:17; 19:15; 1 Kgs 20:20; Jer 5:1; Prov 7:19; and standard spousal terminology.)
With a situation-oriented construal, the clause’s information structure is unmarked rather than marked. That is, אִישׁ is the subject rather than the predicate (and אַתָּה is the predicate rather than the subject); and its referent is the other participant in the depicted situation: the party to whom David is addressing his message. That party is specified as “you”—i.e., Abner. This interpretation yields a coherent text: David’s utterance directly responds to Abner’s question by correcting its false premise that the king is the party whom David was addressing. Abner has misunderstood the situation; David now employs the situating noun so as to clarify the situation.
In other languages, rhetorical questions deployed as answers are known to indicate annoyance at the prior question—which would match David’s situation, given that Abner has misconstrued him. Construed as a rhetorical question, David’s clause at the very least enables him to underscore that he is addressing Abner (not the king), and for good reason. As Moshavi writes, “Speakers use rhetorical questions when they consider the implied assertion of the question to be obvious” (2011:95). The restatement not only follows from his prior reported speech, but also serves as a springboard for the indictment that he is proceeds to deliver to Abner. (Nonetheless, although he speaks to Abner, his real audience—the one who needs to be convinced of David’s loyalty—is King Saul.)
In terms of the information structure of the communication, a topic is already established (as David has clearly addressed himself to someone, while Abner’s challenge has presupposed that this addressee was the king), so a verbless clause’s first element (here אִישׁ) would normally express the inferable ‘given’ information (Van Wolde, “The Verbless Clause and Its Textual Function.” 1999:331). The clause would then be expected to function to situate the previously mentioned referent (ibid.). Indeed, the opening particle הֲלוֹא indicates that the construal of אִישׁ depends upon what preceded (cf. ibid., 332); David’s remark would be presupposing what came before (cf. Van Wolde 1997:41–42).
If אִישׁ indeed evokes the given information, you might wonder why David did not make it definite: הָאִישׁ, as in 2 Sam 12:7 אַתָּה הָאִישׁ ‘That man is you!’ The answer is twofold:
- In the discourse with Abner, there has not yet been explicit mention of an identifiable party to which the label הָאִישׁ could refer. Consequently David would have to qualify it with a modifier such as אֲשֶׁר קְרָאתִיו “whom I hailed” or מְקֹרָאִי “the one whom I hailed” (cf. Isa 48:12)—which would take more communicative effort than necessary. (And someone who is shouting across a considerable distance is unlikely to waste words.)
- Instead, given the speech context, David can be more succinct. For in the dialogue frame under discussion, there is only one other possible participant (אִישׁ) aside from David himself. Thus it can go without saying that the category denoted by אִישׁ has only one member; and in Hebrew, a contextually unique reference needs no determiner.
This construal is consistent with other verbless clauses that open with an indefinite-yet-unique topic expression followed by prosodic stress on the comment, such as Job 22:12 (אֱלוֹהַּ ‘God’) and Est 7:6. In the latter case, bare אִישׁ is likewise used to focus attention on a given situational participant whose identity is at issue: in answer to the question מִי הוּא זֶה “Who is he [the person in question]…?” Esther replies, אִישׁ צַר וְאוֹיֵב הָמָן הָרָע הַזֶּה “The adversary and enemy is this evil Haman!” (Other instances of bare אִישׁ with a contextually unique reference include Gen 2:23; 38:25; Judg 18:25; 1 Sam 10:22; 2 Sam 3:15; 4:11; 18:20.)
Moreover, the ancient audience might well recognize that David has initiated a conventional two-party controversy (רִיב), to accuse Abner of incompetence. I.e., David is arguably treating Abner as an אִישׁ רִיב (see my comment at Judg 12:2). This conceptual frame of the two-party controversy was highly available to the ancient audience (much more so than to later interpreters), for it was a widespread and enduring social institution in ancient Israel (see Bovati’s 1994 monograph on juridical conflict). And again, in that frame, the reference with אִישׁ would be contextually unique.
Meir Malbim (19th c.) likewise reads David’s clause as unmarked, paraphrasing as follows: רצה לומר אתה האיש שעליך מוטל הדבר להעמיד שומרים לראש המלך “I.e., you are the אִישׁ who is responsible for setting up guards for the king’s person.” However, Malbim seems to be interpreting the underspecified term אִישׁ based only on what follows this utterance, rather than on what precedes it.
Happily, the situation-oriented construal not only yields a coherent and informative text, but also it would reliably have cognitive priority—because it assumes that David is employing אִישׁ in its most common, prototypical usage as a situating noun. Therefore it would predictably be the most cognitively available construal—the one that the audience’s mind would try first—and thus it must be the plain sense of this passage. There would be no reason to look farther afield for a more unusual meaning.
In short, the evidence clearly favors my proposal that on the discourse level, this clause means “Isn’t [the unique and salient essential] participant [in the situation under discussion] [—i.e., the one whom I was just addressing—] you?” Thus David succinctly and pointedly underscores that he is addressing Abner in particular, which is what the moment demands.
As for rendering into English, the NJPS ‘You are a man, aren’t you?’ construes the clause as having a predicate focus construction, and as somehow being about manliness—which are problematic for the reasons discussed above. A rendering that instead relies upon the prototypical construal of אִישׁ, couched in idiomatic English, is offered as an alternative in a new footnote.