APPENDIX TO DE AGRICULTURA
§ 13. But contribute nothing to the improvement of character. The ὅσα implies that some parts of dialectic and mathematics do contribute something. With regard to dialectic, this is explained in the sequel. With regard to “geometry,” apart from its use as a προπαίδευμα, Philo would probably have held that, as it included arithmetic, the lore of sacred numbers gave it a higher and spiritual value. This appears very markedly in the disquisition on Four in this treatise.
§ 14. With its threefold division. This fundamental Stoic doctrine is given in Diog. Laert. vii. 40, with the same illustration as here. Another comparison given there and elsewhere is to the egg-shell, the white and the yolk. See Leg. All. i. 57 and note.
§ 41. They are the only real kings. For this well-known Stoic paradox see S.V.F. iii. 617 ff.; cf. De Sobr. 57.
§ 43. Uneven. This word perhaps gives the idea better than “superfluous.” περίσσος is the regular name for “odd” numbers, i.e. those which are something over and above the right or even numbers (ἄρτιος). Other passages in which Jethro is described (De Ebr. 37 and De Mut. 103) were referred to in the note on De Sacr. 50, where, however, the translation “worldling” was perhaps too loose.
§ 73. οἰκόσιτος. Here and in De Plant. 104 Philo uses this word in a disparaging way, which does not appear in the examples quoted from other authors. Usually it means “living at his own expense.” There is, however, an approach to it in Lucian, Somn. 1, where it is applied to a youth who is not yet earning his own living.
§ 80. Sense-perception made pure and clean. In Leg. All. ii. 66 and iii. 103, Miriam stood for rebellious sense.
§ 81. So we find. Here γοῦν as often introduces the scriptural story on which the allegory is founded, the main point of which is the concluding words “horse and rider he threw into the sea.” But there is also an allusion to the opening words, “Then sang Moses and the sons of Israel,” which, as usual, he interprets as “those who see.” The contrast, however, between “all the men” or “all that are men,” and “the best women” is curious, for in Ex. 15:20 all the women sing the song. Perhaps Philo’s memory of the passage misled him.
§ 94. For these are able, etc. There seems to be an illogicality in the sequel. The prayer which follows is not as we should expect, that the horseman should be able to control the horse, but that he should fall off. The best one can make of it is that, though it is meritorious to control passion, complete safety lies in getting rid of it.
§§ 95 ff. The parable of Dan has already been worked out in Leg. All. ii. 94 ff. The principal difference is that there the way (which as here is distinguished from the track) is the soul itself, instead of the road on which the soul travels.
§ 114. An iron-bound thong. The use in boxing of the caestus or leathern thong loaded with lead or iron is best known from the description in Aen. v. 405 ff. Mr. Whitaker’s ingenious suggestion of σιδηροῦν τροπόν for σιδήρου τρόπον (“like iron”) may perhaps be questioned on the ground that τροπός is the thong used for fastening the oar to the thole. But it may have been used more generally, and if so gives an excellent sense. The construction of the ordinary reading is not quite clear.—F. H. C.
§ 119. The Olympic contest, etc. Perhaps rather “the only Olympic contest which can be rightly called sacred is” etc. Philo plays on Ὀλυμπιακός (derived from Olympia) and Ὀλύμπιος (from Olympus).
§§ 128, 129. The view that God causes good only is often insisted on by Philo, e.g. De Op. 75, and De Plant. 53. The thought is Platonic; see Timaeus, 29, 30 and 40, 41, Rep. 379 B, C, and elsewhere.
§ 132. ὑπαναπλέουσαν. Mangey’s conjecture of ἐπαναπολῆ· σαν has some support from De Post. 149 ἐκ τῆς ἐπαναπολήσεως καὶ ὥσπερ ἐπιλεάνσεως τῆς πρῶτον καταβληθείσης τροφῆς. Cf. also ἀναπολῶν, Spec. Leg. iv. 107. On the other hand we have ὑπαναπλεῖ, De Mut. 100.
§ 134. For what use is there … “partless”? The translation assumes that διαίρεσις is futile, because we ultimately arrive at a closed door. If we read ἀδιαίρετα, it is futile, because we never arrive at a point where division ceases. In this case Philo adopts the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter, which was generally held though not without controversy (see Reid on Cic. Acad. i. 27). The same sense might perhaps be obtained by retaining διαιρετά, and taking it as “never finding before you (as a result of your division) separate parts which are called atoms.” It should be noted that this philosophical evidence of the futility of διαίρεσις is merely subsidiary. The true reason, i.e. its moral uselessness, if unaccompanied by meditation, is given in 135.
§§ 140, 141. The grammatical and logical terms of the Stoics, here given, are nearly all stated (generally under the same names) by Diog. Laert. vii. 64–76, with examples which explain their meaning clearly. These are here given for the cases in which explanation is needed (Hicks’s translation is used throughout).
Complete (τέλεια, D.L. αὐτοτελῆ)— “Socrates writes.” / Incomplete (ἀτελῆ, D.L. ἐλλιπῆ)— “Writes,” for we ask “who writes?”
Questions (ἐρωτήματα)— “Is it day?” / Inquiries (πύσματα)— “Where does he live?” which cannot be answered, like the question, by a nod.
Simple propositions (ἀξιώματα ἁπλᾶ)— “It is day.” / Non-simple (οὐχ ἁπλᾶ)— “If it is day, it is light.”
Hypothetical (συνημμένα, as subdivision of the οὐχ ἁπλᾶ)—. “If it is day, it is light.” / Inferential (παρασυνημμένα)— “Since it is day, it is light.”
Indicating more or less (τὰ διασαφοῦντα τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον). “It is rather daytime than night,” or / Disjunctive (διεζευγμένα)— “Either it is day or it is night.”
Predicate (κατηγόρημα) was defined as “what is said of something”; in other words, “a thing associated with one or more subjects”; or “a defective expression which has to be joined on to a nominative case in order to yield a judgement” (ἀξίωμα).
Complements (συμβάματα). The words in D.L. which deal with this are corrupt. Apparently the term means a verb requiring a nominative subject, and therefore is identical with κατηγορήματα, according to the third definition given above. It is opposed to παρασυμβάματα, where the verb is impersonal and the real subject is in another case, as μεταμέλει μοι, “it repents me”=“I repent.”
§ 142. Smooth movement. An Epicurean term (cf. note on De Post. 79), introduced here by Philo for a play on λειανούσῃ, and qualified by τῷ ὄντι to show that he uses it in a higher sense than the Epicureans.
§ 145. Heinemann proposed in preference to Wendland’s suggestion καὶ γὰρ διαίρεσις ἄνευ μνήμης καὶ μελέτη ἅνευ διεξόδου τῶν ἀρίστων. No doubt μελέτη may be taken as the equivalent of μνήμη, but διέξοδος can hardly be equivalent to διαίρεσις. Perhaps the following adaptation of Wendland’s might be read: καὶ γὰρ διαίρεσις ἄνευ μνήμης καὶ μελέτης καὶ διεξόδου τῶν ἀρίστων ἀγαθὸν ἀτελές, <ὡσαύτως δὲ μνήμη ἄνευ διαιρέσεως ἀτελές>, in which the repetition of ἀτελές may have misled the scribe.
§ 160. Solidity. The term πῆξις is Stoic, see S. V.F. iii. 510. The life of ὁ προκόπτων only becomes really happy ὅταν αἱ μέσαι πράξεις … πῆξιν τινὰ λάβωσι.
§ 161. Unconscious of their wisdom. διαλεληθότες again is a Stoic term, though used rather of the fully wise, who do not yet realize their conversion, than, as here, of the man advancing to perfection; see S.V.F. iii. 539, 540.