APPENDIX TO DE CONGRESSU
§ 11. Astronomy, Astronomy of an elementary kind was regularly included among the Encyclia, but is not named by Philo in his other lists of the subjects, doubtless because, as often in other writers, it is regarded as a branch of geometry. Cf. Quintilian, i. 10. 46 “quid quod se eadem geometria tollit ad rationem usque mundi? in qua siderum certos constitutosque cursus numeris docet.”
§ 15. The calamities … undergone. This thought of the ethical value of history and poetry (epic and tragic) has already been brought out in De Sac. 78 f. See also De Abr. 23.
§ 18. Sister and twin. Though ὡς εἶπόν τινες indicates that this is a definite quotation from some writer or writers, the close relation of dialectic to rhetoric, though much discussed by the Stoics (see S.V.F. i. 75, ii. 294), is not described by this phrase in any source known to us. Aristotle speaks of rhetoric as being (1) ἀντίστροφον (counterpart), (2) παραφυές (offshoot), (3) μόριον (part), (4) ὁμοίωμα (copy), of rhetoric (Aristot. Rhet. i. 1. 1, i. 2. 7).
§ 29. On the side of thought … deception. It seems to me almost incredible that Leah’s handmaid, oratory or rhetoric, should on the side of ideas be limited to sophistical rhetoric, though one might understand this sort being admitted with the other, as indeed we find in De Agr. 13. Below in § 33 there is no such disparagement. I am strongly inclined to suspect a lacuna such as ἡ λογική sc. δύναμις <τῆς διανοίας, οὐχ> ἡ κτλ. Or for τῆς διανοίας we might conjecture τῶν πραγμάτων (facts), in which case ἡ λογική would still agree with εὕρεσις.
§ 53. Battles of argument. Elsewhere in Philo this word and γνωσιμαχία seem to be used generally for contention, without any particular meaning attaching to γνωσι-. Here, however, in combination with συλλαβομαχοῦντες, it seems necessary to give the γνωσι- a more definite meaning, such as “of argument” or “as to knowledge.”
§ 54. The fount of human life. Cf. S. V.F. i. 205 ἦθός ἐστι πηγὴ βίου, ἀφʼ ἧς αἱ κατὰ μέρος πράξεις ῥέονσι.
Ibid. <ἀστάς>. That ἀστάς has been lost, as suggested in the footnote, seems to me very probable, though possibly a better form of the sentence, preserving the first ἤ of all MSS., and the ἤ before δόγματα of some, would be παλλακὰς μέντοι ἢ ἀστάς, δόξας ἢ δόγματα. It is true that no Biblical example of the ἀστή of the wicked man is given, but in § 59 her existence as the mother of κακία, while the παλλακή is the mother of πάθος, is assumed. If we make this insertion, the conjunction of δόξα (= παλλακή) with δόγμα (= ἀστή) gets a clear meaning. As it stands, this conjunction, which is not recorded elsewhere, is otiose. But in De Sac. 5 we have them contrasted, the καλὸν δόγμα, Abel, with the ἄτοπος δόξα, Cain, and in general δόγμα, though, as in this case, it may be bad, is associated with principles and convictions arrived at by reason in contrast to unreasoning δόξα. That the former should produce vicious principles (κακία) and the latter fleeting passion is quite in keeping.
§ 77. Doting on poetry … musical colours. Clem. Al. (Strom, i. p. 332) reproduces these words as κατεγήρασαν οἱ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐν μουσικῇ, οἱ δὲ ἐν γεωμετρίᾳ, ἄλλοι δὲ ἐν γραμματικῇ, οἱ πλεῖστοι δὲ ἐν ῥητορικῇ. Hence Mangey strangely thought that γραμμαῖς should be corrected to γραμματικῇ, though in his translation he retains it as “delincationibus.” But Philo’s ποιήμασι gives Clement’s γραμματικῇ, as his γραμμαῖς gives γεωμετρίᾳ. γραμμαῖς cannot mean “drawing,” as Yonge certainly and Mangey presumably supposed. It is a regular term for geometrical figures, and γραμμικαὶ ἀποδείξεις for geometrical proofs (Quintilian i. 10. 38.) Mangey translates χρωμάτων κράσεσι by “temperaturis colorum,” which leaves it doubtful whether he thought, as Yonge did, that it meant painting. There can be no reasonable doubt that it refers to the χρώματα of music. Though Aristotle laid stress on γραφική as a means of education, it never appears among the Encyclia. On the other hand the χρώματα, as shown in § 76, are an important element in music. Aristides Quintilianus (p. 18) gives this explanation of the name: χρῶμα, τὸ διὰ ἡμιτονίων συντεινόμενον· ὡς γὰρ τὸ μεταξὺ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος χρῶμα καλεῖται, οὕτω τὸ διὰ μέσων ἀμφοῖν θεωρούμενον χρῶμα καλεῖται. This suggests that κράσεις χρωμάτων may mean blendings which constitute χρώματα rather than blendings of them, but I leave this to the experts.
§ 79. For philosophy, etc. For this Stoic definition cf. S. V.F. ii. 36 τὴν φιλοσοφίαν φασὶν ἐπιτήδευσιν εἶναι σοφίας, τὴν δὲ σοφίαν ἐπιστήμην θείων τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων πραγμάτων. Cicero gives it in a form nearer to Philo, De Off. ii. 5 “nec quicquam aliud est philosophia … praeter studium sapientiae. Sapientia autem est, ut a veteribus philosophis definitum est, rerum divinarum et humanarum causarumque, quibus eae res continentur, scientia.”
§ 107. περινοίᾳ λογισμοῦ πεποιθυίας. The translation given assumes (1) that πεποιθυίας (of a soul trusting) is not co-ordinate with the other participles, (2) that γενητοῦ agrees with λογισμοῦ; neither of which seems likely, though grammatically possible. Moreover, Philo would probably have written τοῦ πεποιθέναι instead of πεποιθυίας. Wendland conjectured περὶ πάντα λογισμῷ μεμαθηκυίας. This seems very arbitrary. Cohn suggested περινοίᾳ καὶ λογισμῷ πεπονθυίας. But if this means “experiencing through reasoning the nothingness of creation,” it does not seem to me Greek. I suggest as slightly better to transfer περ. λογ. πεπ. and read ἱκετευούσης θεὸν ψυχῆς περινοίᾳ λογισμοῦ <οὐ> πεποιθυίας καὶ τὴν ταπεινότητα καὶ οὐδενείαν τοῦ γενητοῦ καὶ τὰς ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς καλοῖς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ ἀκρότητας τοῦ ἀγενήτου δεδιδαγμένης. This will make good sense and run smoothly, and it seems more likely that Philo thinks that human sagacity (περίνοια) or even human reason proves worthless in this supreme abasement, than that it is the agent by which the soul is schooled to humiliate itself, as Cohn’s and Wendland’s suggestions imply. Textually the loss of οὐ after λογισμοῦ is negligible and the departure from the MSS., apart from the slight change of -αν to -ᾳ, lies in the transference of the three difficult words. I shall not be surprised however if it does not give general satisfaction.
§ 133. The founder of this tribe. Wendland gives as reference for the saying “God alone must I honour” Ex. 20:3, i.e. the First Commandment, and therefore presumably took the γενάρχης to be Moses. But the reference is, I think, to the Blessing of Levi (Deut. 33:9) “who saith to his father and his mother I have not seen thee, and his brothers he knew not and his sons he disclaimed.” In Leg. All. ii. 51 Philo has made a very similar use of this text (though there the father and the mother are mind and body), inferring from it that the Levi-mind rejects all such things for the sake of having God as his portion, in accordance with the words of Deut. 10:9, which he again quotes here. And the same interpretation of Deut. 33:9 is given in De Fug. 89, where Levi is called ὁ ἀρχηγέτης τοῦ θιάσου τούτου.
§ 141. A system of conceptions, etc. For this Stoic definition cf. S. V.F. i. 73, ii. 93 f. Sometimes in a longer form, συγγεγυμνασμένων καὶ ἐπὶ τέλος εὔχρηστον τῷ βίῳ λαμβανόντων (ἐχόντων) τὴν ἀναφόραν, where the masculine λαμβανόντων shews that συγγ. also is masculine and that not the conceptions but the things conceived of are coordinated. As ἐγγεγυμνασμένων appears in some examples (see S.V.F. i. 73), Wendland is perhaps somewhat rash in altering to συγγ. If ἐγγ. is retained, translate “exercised upon.”
Ibid. For the definition of ἐπιστήμη, given in practically the same words as here, see S.V.F. i. 68.
§ 148. Elucidation of the … poets and historians. This definition with minor variations was the accepted one. In the grammar of Dionysius Thrax, which furnished the model for the later grammarians, both Greek and Latin, it appears in the form ἐμπειρία τῶν παρὰ ποιηταῖς τε καὶ συγγραφεῦσι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ λεγομένων. The definition brings out the important fact that γραμματική originally suggested literary study rather than what we call grammar.
§ 149. The only terms in this list which either need explanation or have not had it on De Agr. 140, 141 are ἀποφαντόν and περιεκτικόν. From Diog. Laert. vii. 65 it appears that ἀποφαντόν which I have rendered by “declaratory” = ἀξίωμα, i.e. a statement which must be either true or false, which cannot be said of the forms of speech (ἐρώτημα, etc.) which follow. While D. L. himself defines ἀξίωμα as πρᾶγμα αὐτοτελές ἀποφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφʼ ἑαυτῷ, he has confused his interpreters by quoting Chrysippus: ἀξίωμά ἐστι τὸ ἀποφαντὸν ἢ καταφαντὸν ὅσον ἐφʼ ἑαυτῷ, οἷον Ἡμέρα ἐστί, Δίων περιπατεῖ. This has led Hicks to translate ἀποφαντόν “capable of being denied,” as opposed to καταφαντόν. But this is surely to confuse ἀποφαντός from ἀποφαίνω with ἀποφατικός from ἀπόφημι. Liddell & Scott both in the earlier and in the recent edition make the confusion worse, as while giving ἀποφ. as = “asserting,” they say under καταφ. “to be affirmed, opposed to ἀποφαντός.” I feel no doubt that ἀποφ. is “affirming” or “capable of being affirmed,” and I should explain the καταφαντόν of Chrysippus as a synonym, which some preferred, unless indeed he means that ἀποφ. is used of such sentences as ἡμέρα ἑστί, and καταφ. of such as Δίων περιπατεῖ. Also it might easily be a gloss.
It should be added that as to ἀποφαντικός, sometimes used for the indicative mood, the examples shew that no doubt is possible, and ἀποφαντικός can hardly be separated from ἀποφαντός.
As for περιεκτικόν, it is most probably a mistake for προστακτικόν (imperative), which appears in D. L.’s list. At any rate if it is genuine, it must have some meaning unknown to us. The only sense in which we meet the word is for a place in which a number of things or persons are collected, e.g. ἀμπελών, παρθενών. Stephanus, indeed, has a statement, which L. & S. have copied, that περιεκτικὸν ῥῆμα is a verb in the middle voice, but no authority is given. And both these meanings are impossible in a list which contains different forms of sentences.
§ 155. “In thy hands.” I suspect that Philo suggests in this section that the Greek of the text quoted may mean not only “The handmaid is in thy hands (or power),” but also “Thy handmaid is in the hands.” It must be remembered that when he gives two alternative meanings for a passage, he does not think, as we should, that one must be the right one. To his mind they may both be intended. If we suppose that he is here commenting on “Thy handmaid is in the hands,” the argument will become much clearer. The supposition will involve reading here ἐν ταῖς χερσί for ἐν ταῖς χερσί σου, but there is not much difficulty in this. A scribe failing to see the point might very naturally add σου.
§ 159. Unrebuked. Or “whose licence is unchecked.” Mangey suspected ἀνεπίπληκτος in this sense, and perhaps it more generally means “not liable to rebuke,” “blameless.” But see Plato, Legg. 695 B, where it is applied to the undisciplined boyhood of Cyrus’s sons, who left to women and eunuchs became οἵους ἦν εἰκὸς αὐτοὺς γενέσθαι τροφῇ ἀνεπιπλήκτῳ τραφέντας. So too in manhood they are τρυφῆς μεστοὶ καὶ ἀνεπιπληξίας.
Ibid. ὑπαργύρους καὶ ὑποχρύσους. These adjectives, which Mangey translated by “aureos et argenteos,” ignoring the ὑπο-, are at first sight very difficult. All the evidence in the dictionaries hitherto given goes to prove that the prefix indicates not that the silver or gold conceals some other metal, but that it is covered or concealed by it. Thus while ὑπάργυρος may suggest a base coin, because the silver is coated with gold, ὑπόχρυσος would only suggest gold concealed by some baser metal. An article, however, by A. Körte in Hermes, 1929, pp. 262 f., to which Dr. Rouse called my attention, brings considerable evidence from inscriptions of the third century, as well as a line from Menander, 170 ff. (ὑπόχρυσος δακτύλιός τις οὑτοσί, αὐτὸς σιδηροῦς), to shew that ὑποχ. is used of iron rings or the like gilded over. Körte does not deal with ὑπάργυρος, but the same principle will apply. He connects the prefix with the common use of ὑπο- in adjectives, particularly in medical language, to indicate “somewhat,” e.g. ὑπόλευκος “whitish.” While he translates ὑπόχρυσος “gilded,” it need not be inferred, I think, that the word in itself means this. Rather the two words are opposed to ὁλόχρυσος, ὁλάργυρος, and indicate that the gold and silver are not the predominant, or at least not the sole elements. But since, as a matter of fact, the admixture of gold or silver would regularly take the form of a coating, “veneered” or “plated” may stand.
§ 160. Admonition. I do not think that Philo can have written νουθεσίαν. Apart from the absurdity pointed out in the footnote, the ὥστε demands something inferred from the text, which has stated that those who live without κάκωσις forsake God. The inference must be that those who are under κάκωσις cleave to Him. I think Philo must have written εὐσέβειαν or θεοσέβειαν, which by some blunder was changed to νουθεσίαν as νομοθεσίαν to ἐκκλησίαν in § 120.
§ 171. Eve. Here again one can only suppose a similar blunder, possibly assisted by the similarity of ΚΑΙΕΥΑΝ to ΚΑΙΝ. Though Wendland retains the MS. text, it seems to me incredible that Philo should have thought that Cain was expelled from Paradise. At any rate, even if Philo wrote Cain, he meant to write Eve.