וְאֵין לְךָ מִצְוָה גְּדוֹלָה כְּזותYou Will Not Find a Greater Mitzvah Than This

With thanks to hevrutot extraordinaire, Norman Shore and Rabbi Gilah Langner, and to the extended community of Havurat Shalom.

For the first two pages (before looking at the subsequent sources), look at these pesukim, and try to identify which single, specific mitzvah puts one at risk of violating them all.

Pause here, and consider who in today's world would meet the definition of a captive that needs to be freed.

Given the priority placed by these sources on fulfilling this mitzvah, what steps do you feel obligated to take, individually or as a community?

Then proceed on to the following sources.

The following Teshuva from the Maharam of Lublin (Meir ben Gedaliah, 16th century) encapsulates and recapitulates the issues covered by the previous sources. Among many interesting aspects, it highlights the community's responsibilities to the captive, even when missteps, sins, or illegal behavior is involved.

Note: The translation below is my own, and therefore thoroughly unreliable. Please help me identify errors and improve my understanding, by letting me know what I've mistranslated or missed entirely.

Maharam of Lublin (1558-1616), Mnahir Einai Chachamim (She’elot and T’shuvot), #15

שאלה

I received an inquiry concerning a young man who is imprisoned in a Muslim country based on accusations of immoral conduct with a Muslim woman and who is subject to the death penalty or to forced conversion, chas v’shalom. The question is whether the Jewish community is obligated to redeem him from captivity, in accordance with the mitzvah of pidyon shivuyim (redeeming captives), or whether he has brought punishment on himself and the community is exempt from redeeming him, even if one considers his sin to have only been committed because of personal weakness. A further question is whether the fact that he may be in mortal danger outweighs his own responsibility for his predicament, or if because of the threat to his life, the community is obligated to even pay more than his worth, and how much that might be.

תשובה

This is a straightforward question. According to the section of the Gemara (Gittin 46b) where it is taught concerning the one who sells themselves (for servitude) to non-Jews, this young man is subject to the mitzvah of redeeming the captive. The community should not consider itself exempt from its obligation to redeem him, because he has sinned. For his sin is no greater than that of one who sells himself to non-Jews. And in that latter case, one is obligated (to redeem him) not just the first time it happens, but the second time one redeems him too.

It is taught in the Mishnah, that one who sells himself to non-Jews is not redeemed, but Rav Ashi explains that the first time we redeem him, and the second time, and the mishnah only refers to the third time. And even in the latter case, it assumes that they are not intending to kill him [for if he were in danger, the community would be obligated to redeem him]. Is this person [who has sold himself into servitude to non-Jews] considered a sinner?

All the poskin [halachic decisors] agree that there is no greater sinner than the one who sells himself into a criminal gang. Yet even in this case, Rav Ami rules that one must redeem that person, not only the second time but even the third time it happens, because they will intend to kill him. So the point is, [under these circumstances, the obligation remains, for] the second and the third time.

And if this were not the case, then why would Rav Ami need to say, “all the more so given the risk of death in this case”, as it is written there (Gittin 47a)? As it is explained in the words of the Rambam and the Tur, where they have written that if the captors intend to kill the captive, then the captive must be redeemed, no matter how many times the situation recurs.

Nonetheless, the Sefer Mitzvot Gadol [of Moses ben Jacob of Coucy] and the Sefer Mitzvot Katan [of Isaac ben Joseph of Corbeil] have written in the name of Rabbi Eliezer [ben Samuel] of Metz, and we conclude with his words – what do we learn from this passage in the Gemara, where Rav Ami would redeem even the apostate, as long as he is giving into weakness [when carrying out his apostasy]? That [Rav Ami] is going beyond the strict requirements of the law, and that the only reason he rules thusly is that he was told the person ate forbidden foods out of personal weakness. For it is clear that Rav Ami still wanted to redeem him, even after being told of his apostasy, for he responded, “One can assume that these acts were due to personal weakness,” and he still wanted to redeem him. This is clearly going beyond the strict requirements of the law. But before being told of his apostasy, Rav Ami’s desire to redeem him was a halachic requirement and an obligation, despite the captive’s sin [of selling himself in bondage to a non-Jew]. The Mishnah itself is the basis for this conclusion, for when it teaches, “but the children are redeemed” because of their suffering, it teaches about an obligation.

For those who believe that the community should be exempt from their obligation because this case resembles [the case in the Gemara of] the apostate who ate forbidden foods, they do not appear at all similar. For it is possible that the non-Jewish captors forced this upon him. And one who sins a single time is not termed an apostate, and all the more so one who is being compelled.

We must follow the writings of Tosafot on the first chapter of Tractate Hulin [14a], concerning the case of the one who carries out kosher slaughtering on Shabbat or Yom Kippur. They express surprise that the meat slaughtered by the malicious apostate [mezid] is kosher, yet for the merely non-conformist apostate [mumar] who violated shabbat, the meat is forbidden. Their response is that the latter case must have involved public shabbat desecration, while the former case must have been under compulsion. And they further conclude that a single instance [of sinning] does not cause one to be considered an apostate.

If you insist on inquiring into the differentiation between the rules of kosher slaughter and other legal domains, then consider what R. Yosef Karo brings in [Even ha-Ezer] Section 160:2, which is also relevant to the matter that I have brought to judgment. The wife of a Cohen that is amongst non-Jews a single time is not considered an apostate. All the more so, the prohibition is brought concerning [relations with] a foreign woman, for whom the mitzvah is not from the torah, but rather from the tradition or from the sages, who decreed concerning her because of Nashga"z [the four different Issurim derabanan: “Niddah”, “Shifcha”, “Goya”, “Zonah”], as is explained by all of the poskin and in the Tur, Even ha-Ezer Section 16. And in particular, in our day, because of our many sins, many people are defiled by this sin. So someone should not be considered an apostate acting out of personal weakness.

It is also possible to bring proof that even if a person is perceived as not having a presumption of halachic fitness, and also has sinned against themselves, nonetheless the community is obligated to redeem them [from captivity]. Thus we find in the glosses of the Mordechai on tractate Gittin...??…

Nonetheless, one cannot rule for an exempting to the obligation to redeem them, unless they’ve [sinned] twice or three times. And if they have, then in the end they are like all the other people of Israel, and the first time they are captured, you still redeem them, and the second as well. And if their captors intend to kill them, then it doesn’t matter how many times they have been redeemed before, as discussed above.

All the more so [the obligation to redeem the captive remains firm] given that no witnesses can testify to the actions of the young man, and given that non-Jews can be presumed to be capable of lying [sic]. And doubly so in our time, because of the abundance of our sins.

Conclusion: Relying on all these reasons, it seems there is no basis to release the community from the obligation to redeem this captive.

But what of the question of the size of the ransom?

Certainly, one can say that it is a simple matter, that the community is not obligated to pay a ransom exceeding the captive’s worth. And I don’t know how it could enter anyone’s thoughts that it is required to pay a ransom exceeding a captive’s worth, at least for any captive other than a Torah scholar, as is explained by the poskin. This limitation is connected to two different ideas in the Gemara [Gittin 45a]: financial pressure on the community, and not [to encourage the kidnappers] to seize [more captives], for if they were rewarded with a large ransom, then every day they would be going after each Jewish person who was entering their domain.

It is possible to say that since [the captive] was caught with a prostitute and since the kidnappers didn’t carry him off in order to kill him, that someone should decide that the only circumstance for overpaying is if they intend to kill him, and that they would only be redeemed at all the second or third time if they were in mortal danger. But one should learn from our passage in the Gemara that for those who sell themselves into captivity, the community does not overpay. For when it teaches, “but redeem their children,” this requirement is met by paying only their worth. For after all, even Rav Ami, who wants you to redeem the [original] captive, brings his proof from “but redeem their children”. For what does “but redeem their children” teach? That one should redeem the children for no more than their worth. Then by comparison, the subject of the first part of the mishnah, the original captive that sold themselves to a non-Jew, should not be redeemed even for their worth [if this is the third or more time they’ve sold themselves], so obviously the community shouldn’t overpay for them, since it’s obvious that they’re not superior to other captives. And so the comparison to “but redeem their children” also refers to paying only their worth.

You can also bring further proof from what the Gemara teaches, that for the one who is not in danger of defilement at the hands of the non-Jews, the community does not need to overpay. But Tosafot there [Gittin 45a] brings the contradiction that Rabbi Yehoshua ben Hananiya redeemed one particular youth [from captivity in Rome, see Gittin 58a] for a vast sum because of the child’s amazing wisdom. What’s bothering Tosafot? That in one source, it teaches that we redeem anyone when we’re concerned that they’re in danger of defilement by non-Jews – and in this case, we have a child, concerning whom the Mishna teaches, “but redeem their children”, precisely so that they should not be defiled by non-Jews. But then according to that source, one cannot overpay! So that’s why Rav Ami has to bring the additional factor, that they were also at risk of being killed. Thus it’s obvious why we have to bring the rule for judging as we do.

We can bring further evidence from the responsum of Rabbeinu Yaakov Weil [15^th century, Germany], #148 [in his She'elot u-Teshubot], in the case of Avraham Ezra, whose his wife and daughter were taken captive and the wife was in danger of execution by the ruler, while they wanted to convert the daughter to Islam. R. David ransomed them for 1000 gold pieces, but Avraham Ezra didn’t want to repay him, because they had been redeemed for more than their worth. Rabbeinu Yaakov ruled that the limitation on overpaying doesn’t apply in cases of mortal danger, and that one is permitted to pay beyond one’s capacity to raise the funds, see also #143.

And one might [think that one should] learn from this case that one is [otherwise] not obligated, even in the case of mortal danger, to redeem the captive for more than their worth, except when a spouse is involved, and then one should follow the ruling of the ROS”H and consider the spouse as being part of one’s own self. Similarly, the [other] Mahara”m, ben Baruch, in his Responsum #164 ruled that even if the ransom were 10 times the worth, one should follow the ruling of the primary argument in the Mishnah instead of the ruling of R. Shimon ben Gamliel. But if this were the basis, then Rabbeinu Yaakov Weil would have said so explicitly.

Nor can we say that the outcome was determined on the basis of this particular man, Avraham Ezra, being famously wealthy, as is discussed within that responsum. For the decision wasn’t for only paying the wife’s worth, in accordance with R. Shimon ben Gamliel, and wasn’t limited to only a case where the husband is wealthy.

The standard interpretation of paying the person’s “worth” is that it refers to the amount that would be fetched in the marketplace when they were sold as a servant. One can bring proof from what the Rambam wrote in Laws of Women, Chapter 14, where he writes that they didn’t obligate the husband to overpay for his spouse, because she is equivalent to all other captives. The explanation for his ruling is that it is in accordance with the view of R. Shimon ben Gamliel, who said that one only redeem captives for more than their worth etc. And concerning this, the Rav ha-Magid wrote that “they didn’t obligate the husband etc” in the Gemara is a dispute between Tanaaim, and the legal rulings in this matter interpreted “worth” as meaning the price of a maidservant sold in the marketplace, and not according to the personal worth of the husband. And so wrote the Rav [Ya’akov Weil], and the matter is clear.

If this is the case, then all the more so, the definition of the worth of captives should not be defined by the wealth of whomever redeems them, for example when a father redeems a son or a daughter. And similarly, the maximum ransom should not be defined on the basis of the wealth of the individual community that is obligated to redeem a captive. Furthermore, when R. Shimon ben Gamliel equates a spouse with all other captives, and similarly as is written in Shaltei ha-Giborim, page 488, in the name of Rabbi Yitzchak Or Zarua [Isaac ben Moses of Vienna, 13^th century], that “one is not required to redeem for more than the captive’s worth, according to what would be fitting if the person would be sold in the marketplace as a servant” and so on, that even though in our country one doesn’t usually sell people as servants or slaves in the marketplace, nonetheless, one ultimately cannot find a single recent halachic source that provides any guidance for modern times, other than what is originally given in the Gemara. So also in our time, it is necessary to evaluate the captive’s worth based on what they would have been sold for, were there a marketplace that sells people as servants, such as for example in Muslim countries, and approximate based on a hypothetical of assigning that person to an agent who would bring them to such a place and sell them. Everything is determined according to the particulars of the situation and the era.

Nonetheless, we find in the words of R. Yosef Karo [Beit Yosef, Yoreh De’ah?] 8:2, writing in his responsum on the question that was asked, that it was never intended by Shimon [ben Gamliel?] and his cohort that one should pay bit by bit except for the poor, since one typically doesn’t provide a large single payment to the poor – yet for the issue of redeeming captives, where it’s known that a single large payment is typically required to redeem them, and some say for charitable funds, etc. One could say that the intended meaning is to make a single large payment corresponding to how tzedakah is divided for the poor, usually in very small portions; one shouldn’t interpret his words as meaning that [the poor] are obligated to redeem captives [by themselves], since a single large payment is usually required to redeem them.

Therefore I have written what appears to me to be the ruling according to the law from the Talmud and the poskim.

Addendum:

The truth is, I have learned a secret wisdom and guidance, with the complete wisdom and torah-learning of the man, Moshe ?? Yehoshua. And it appears to me that there is no trouble equivalent to the wounds of youth, not even their death or atonement. And thus we must conclude that their rulings should not apply for this youth, with respect to any sin or mortal judgment.

For it seems from the letter that was written, that the woman described as a prostitute was just someone that he lusted after and was prepared to pay for. And if they don’t redeem the youth, it will be accounted to them from another place, and just because they think they are exempt based on his evil thought, the money [that would have gone for his ransom] will be taken from their hand for cause. Furthermore, if they rescue him themselves [without paying ransom], he will be consumed with fiery anger at them greater than in the parable of the lion or the wolf[??].

And if, has v’shalom, the youth is forced to convert to Islam, the fault will be theirs, and further ruinous consequence will ensue, and who knows where these matters could ultimately arrive, has v’shalom.

Therefore, since you are wise and understanding people, you will weigh the scales of intellect and [choose] the clear path that is good and correct for you, according to the particulars of the situation and the era. This is equitable and easy to understand. Therefore El Shaddai will protect you, and will admit that the troubles of His people of Israel are sufficient.

I send to you boundless blessing,

Signed,

Meir ben Gedalia [the Maharam of Lublin]