I chose to highlight this daf, Gittin 35, because it showcases the complex role of women in the Gemara. At the core of the daf is a fascinating story about a woman who changed an aspect of Jewish law in an unconventional fashion. After several difficult statements about the role of women during the time of the Talmud - for example, the blanket assumption that a woman would always rather be married than single, the implication that women are more suspect than men when it comes to lying about monetary matters , and the notion that a woman’s power lies in her (occult seeming) ability to utter curses - comes a story of empowerment that is anchored around knowledge, justice and social action. The woman in this story is deprived of her inheritance and sustenance. Her implied knowledge of the rulings of two different rabbis, combined with the bold, if radical action she takes, serve as a change catalyst. Although it is too late for her, through her actions she improves the lot of women for generations to come.
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משום חינא אקילו רבנן גבה קא משמע לן: נמנעו מלהשביעה: מ"ט אילימא משום דרב כהנא דאמר רב כהנא ואמרי לה אמר רב יהודה אמר רב מעשה באדם אחד בשני בצורת שהפקיד דינר זהב אצל אלמנה והניחתו בכד של קמח ואפאתו בפת ונתנתו לעני לימים בא בעל הדינר ואמר לה הבי לי דינרי אמרה ליה יהנה סם המות באחד מבניה של אותה אשה אם נהניתי מדינרך כלום אמרו לא היו ימים מועטין עד שמת אחד מבניה וכששמעו חכמים בדבר אמרו מה מי שנשבע באמת כך הנשבע על שקר על אחת כמה וכמה מאי טעמא איענשה דאישתרשי לה מקום דינר ומאי מי שנשבע באמת כמי שנשבע באמת אי משום הא מאי איריא אלמנה אפילו גרושה נמי אלמה א"ר זירא אמר שמואל לא שנו אלא אלמנה אבל גרושה משביעין אותה אלמנה שאני דבההיא הנאה דקא טרחה קמי דיתמי אתיא לאורויי היתרא אמר רב יהודה אמר ר' ירמיה בר אבא רב ושמואל דאמרי תרוייהו לא שנו אלא בב"ד אבל חוץ לבית דין משביעין אותה איני והא רב לא מגבי כתובה לארמלתא קשיא בסורא מתנו הכי בנהרדעא מתנו הכי אמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל לא שנו אלא בבית דין אבל חוץ לב"ד משביעין אותה ורב אמר אפי' חוץ לב"ד נמי אין משביעין אותה רב לטעמיה דרב לא מגבי כתובה לארמלתא וליאדרה וליגבייה בשני דרב קילי נדרי ההיא דאתאי לקמיה דרב הונא אמר לה מה אעביד ליך דרב לא מגבי כתובה לארמלתא אמרה ליה מידי הוא טעמא אלא דלמא נקיטנא מידי מכתובתי חי ה' צבאות אם נהניתי מכתובתי כלום אמר רב הונא מודה רב בקופצת ההיא דאתאי לקמיה דרבה בר רב הונא אמר לה מאי אעביד ליך דרב לא מגבי כתובה לארמלתא ואבא מרי לא מגבי כתובה לארמלתא אמרה ליה הב לי מזוני אמר לה מזוני נמי לית ליך דאמר רב יהודה אמר שמואל התובעת כתובתה בב"ד אין לה מזונות אמרה ליה אפכוה לכורסיה כבי תרי עבדא לי הפכוה לכורסיה ותרצוה ואפילו הכי לא איפרק מחולשא אמר ליה רב יהודה לרב ירמיה ביראה אדרה בב"ד ואשבעה חוץ לב"ד וליתי קלא וליפול באודני דבעינא כי היכי דאעביד בה מעשה גופא אמר רבי זירא אמר שמואל לא שנו אלא אלמנה אבל גרושה משביעין אותה וגרושה דאדרה לא והא שלחו מתם איך פלוניתא בת פלוני קבילת גיטא מן ידא דאחא בר הידיא דמתקרי איה מרי ונדרת ואסרת פירות שבעולם עלה דלא קבילת מכתובתה אלא גלופקרא אחד וספר תהלים אחד וספר איוב וממשלות בלואים ושמנום בחמשה מנה לכשתבא לידכם הגבוה את השאר אמר רב אשי ההוא גט יבמין הוה: התקין רבן גמליאל הזקן שתהא נודרת כו': אמר רב הונא לא שנו אלא בשלא ניסת אבל ניסת אין מדירין אותה ניסת מאי טעמא דמיפר לה בעל כי לא ניסת נמי לכי מנסבא מיפר לה בעל אין הבעל מיפר בקודמין וניחוש דלמא אזלה לגבי חכם ושרי לה קסבר צריך לפרט את הנדר רב נחמן אמר אפי' ניסת ניסת ודאי מיפר לה בעל דמדרינן לה ברבים מיתיבי ניסת גובה כתובתה אם נדרה מאי לאו נדרה השתא לא דנדרה מעיקרא והתניא ניסת נודרת וגובה כתובתה תנאי היא דאיכא למאן דאמר נדר שהודר ברבים יש לו הפרה ואיכא למאן דאמר אין לו הפרה איבעיא להו צריך לפרט את הנדר או אינו צריך רב נחמן אמר אינו צריך רב פפא אמר צריך רב נחמן אמר אינו צריך דאי אמרת צריך זימנין דגייז ליה לדיבוריה וחכם מאי דשמע מיפר רב פפא אמר צריך משום מילתא דאיסורא תנן הנושא נשים בעבירה פסול עד שידור הנאה ותני עלה נודר ועובד יורד ומגרש ואי אמרת אינו צריך לפרט את הנדר ליחוש דילמא אזיל לגבי חכם ושרי ליה
Due to the increased desirability that this would bring her when trying to remarry, since this would ensure she would bring assets with her into a new marriage, the Sages were lenient with her, as the Sages issued several decrees in connection with the marriage contract in order to enable women to collect more easily. Therefore, the mishna teaches us that this is not the case. § The mishna taught that the court refrained from administering an oath to her. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that they refrained from administering oaths to widows? If we say that it is because of the statement of Rav Kahana, as Rav Kahana says, and some say that it was Rav Yehuda who says that Rav says: There was an incident involving a person during years of famine who deposited a gold dinar with a widow, and she placed the gold dinar in a jug of flour and unwittingly baked it in a loaf of bread along with the flour, and she gave the bread as charity to a poor man. After a period of time, the owner of the dinar came and said to her: Give me my dinar. She said to him: May poison benefit, i.e., take effect on, one of the children of that woman, i.e., my children, if I derived any benefit from your dinar. It was said: Not even a few days passed until one of her children died, and when the Sages heard of this matter, they said: If one who takes an oath truthfully is punished in this way for sin, one who takes an oath falsely, all the more so. The Gemara first clarifies the details of the incident: What is the reason that she was punished if she in fact did not derive any benefit from the dinar? The Gemara answers: Because she benefited [ishtarshi] from the place of the dinar, as the dinar took up space in the bread, enabling her to use less flour. Therefore, she did derive some small benefit from the dinar. The Gemara asks: If she in fact did derive benefit from the dinar, then what is meant by the statement: One who takes an oath truthfully? Wasn’t her oath actually false? The Gemara answers: It means that she was like one who took an oath truthfully, as her oath was truthful to the best of her knowledge. In any case, this woman was punished severely for a small mistake. The severity of taking a false oath, even inadvertently, is why the Sages ceased administering oaths to widows. The Gemara questions if this could be the reason for the ordinance: If they refrained from administering oaths due to this reason, then why would this be limited specifically to a widow? Even a divorcée should not be allowed to take an oath to collect her marriage contract as well. Why then does Rabbi Zeira say that Shmuel says: They taught this only with regard to a widow; however, with regard to a divorcée, the court does administer an oath to her? Why would this concern not apply in the case of a divorcée as well? The Gemara answers: A widow is different, as she continues to live in the house with the orphans and performs many services for them in the running of the home. Therefore, there is a concern that due to the benefit they receive from her as a result of the efforts she exerts for the orphans, she will rationalize and permit herself to take an oath that she had not collected any of her marriage contract, when in fact she had received a part of it. § Rav Yehuda said that Rabbi Yirmeya bar Abba said: It is Rav and Shmuel who both say that they taught only that an oath is not administered to the widow in court, as the oath that one takes in court is a severe oath, which involves the mentioning of God’s name and the holding of a sacred object. However, outside of court, where an oath is not taken in this manner, the judges administer an oath to her. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But Rav does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow because she has not taken an oath, which indicates that he also would not administer an oath to her outside of the court. The Gemara answers: This is difficult, as it contradicts the statement of Rav Yehuda. In the city of Sura they taught the statement with regard to the opinions of Rav and Shmuel like this, as stated above. However, in the city of Neharde’a they taught the statement with regard to the opinions of Rav and Shmuel like this: Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says that they taught only that an oath is not administered to the widow in court; however, outside of court the judges administer an oath to her. And Rav says: Even outside of court as well, the judges do not administer an oath to her. The Gemara points out that according to this version of their statements, Rav conforms to his standard line of reasoning, as Rav does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow in any case. The Gemara asks with regard to Rav’s practice: Let him administer a vow to the widow, instead of an oath, and collect the marriage contract in accordance with the mishna, which states that a widow can take a vow in place of the oath. The Gemara answers: In Rav’s time vows were treated lightly, and Rav was concerned that widows would not treat the prohibition created by the vow with appropriate severity. This would result in the orphans losing out on part of their inheritance, and the widows violating the prohibitions created by their vows. The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain widow who came before Rav Huna and attempted to collect payment of her marriage contract from the orphans. He said to her: What can I do for you, as Rav does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow. The widow said to him: Isn’t the reason that I cannot collect payment only because of a concern that perhaps I already took some payment of my marriage contract? I swear as the Lord of Hosts lives that I did not derive any benefit from my marriage contract. Rav Huna says: Even though the court does not administer an oath to a widow, Rav concedes with regard to one who leaps and takes an oath of her own initiative that her oath is accepted, and she can collect payment of her marriage contract. The Gemara relates: There was an incident involving a certain widow who came before Rabba bar Rav Huna to collect payment of her marriage contract. He said to her: What can I do for you, as Rav does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow, and my father, my master, i.e., Rav Huna, does not collect payment of a marriage contract for a widow? She said to him: If I cannot collect payment of the marriage contract, then provide sustenance for me from my husband’s property, to support me until I remarry. He said to her: You also do not have any right to sustenance, as Rav Yehuda says that Shmuel says: One who demands payment of her marriage contract in court has no right to receive sustenance any longer. The husband committed to provide for her sustenance only as long as she does not wish to remarry. Generally, once a widow demands payment of her marriage contract, she demonstrates that she wishes now to remarry and is no longer entitled to receive sustenance from her deceased husband’s property. The widow became angry and said to Rabba bar Rav Huna: May his chair be overturned, i.e., he should fall from his position of power, as he ruled for me in accordance with the different opinions of two people. Since Rabba bar Rav Huna was concerned about her curse, he overturned his chair in order to fulfill the curse literally, and then stood it up, and even so, he was not saved from the weakness that resulted from her curse. With regard to this issue, the Gemara recounts: Rav Yehuda, the student of Shmuel, said to Rav Yirmeya Bira’a: If a widow comes to collect payment of her marriage contract, administer a vow in court and administer an oath outside of court, and let the report be received in my ears that you did so, as I desire to perform an action, i.e., to enable a widow to collect payment of her marriage contract, in contrast to the statements of Rav’s students, who hold that a widow cannot collect payment of her marriage contract. § The Gemara returns to the matter itself. The mishna taught that the court does not administer an oath to a widow in order to enable her to collect payment of her marriage contract. Rabbi Zeira says that Shmuel says: They taught this only with regard to a widow; however, with regard to a divorcée, the court does administer an oath to her. The Gemara asks: Is that to say that if the court administered a vow to a divorcée and not an oath, then this is not sufficient to enable her to collect payment of her marriage contract? But didn’t they send from there, from Eretz Yisrael, a document that states the following: How so-and-so, the daughter of so-and-so, received a bill of divorce from the hand of Aḥa bar Hidya, who is called Ayya Mari, and she took a vow and prohibited the produce of the world to herself, based on the truth of her statement that she did not receive from her marriage contract anything other than one coat [gelofkera], and one book of Psalms, and a book of Job, and a book of Proverbs, all of which were worn out. And we appraised them, and found that their value is five hundred dinars. When she comes to you with this document, collect the rest of the payment for her from her husband’s property in Babylonia. This demonstrates that it is also sufficient for a divorcée to take a vow. Rav Ashi said: That bill of divorce was a levirate bill of divorce that she received from the brother of her deceased husband and not a standard bill of divorce. She therefore took a vow, and not an oath, in the manner of all widows, as she was demanding payment of her marriage contract from the property of her deceased husband. § The mishna taught: Rabban Gamliel the Elder instituted that she should take, for the benefit of the orphans, any vow that the orphans wished to administer to her. Rav Huna says: They taught this halakha only in a case where she did not marry again; however, if she married again, they do not administer a vow to her. The Gemara raises a difficulty: What is the reason that a widow who married again may not take a vow in order to collect? It is because of a concern that perhaps she is lying and is not concerned about the vow that she took, as she relies on the fact that her husband will nullify her vow. If so, when she is not married one should also be concerned that she may rely on the fact that when she will marry again, her husband will nullify her vow. The Gemara answers: The halakha is that the husband does not have the ability to nullify with regard to vows his wife took prior to their marriage. The Gemara asks: But let us be concerned that perhaps she in fact received payment of her marriage contract, and she relies on the fact that she will go to a halakhic authority and he will dissolve the vow for her. The Gemara answers: Rav Huna holds that one who wishes to have a vow dissolved must detail the vow before the halakhic authority who dissolves it. There is no concern that the halakhic authority, knowing that she vowed in order to collect the payment of the marriage contract, will dissolve it. Rav Naḥman disagreed with Rav Huna and said: Even if she married again, the orphans can have the court administer a vow to the widow. The Gemara asks: If she married, then her husband will certainly nullify this vow. The Gemara answers that we, the court, administer the vow in public, and therefore her husband cannot nullify the vow. The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rav Huna from a baraita: In a case where she married again, she collects payment of her marriage contract if she has taken a vow. What, is it not the case that she takes a vow now, after she has remarried? The Gemara answers: No, it is possible to explain that it is referring to when she took a vow initially, before remarrying. The Gemara raises another difficulty for Rav Huna: But isn’t it taught explicitly in a baraita: If she married again, she takes a vow and collects payment of her marriage contract. Here, it is clear that she takes the vow after remarrying. The Gemara answers: This is a dispute between tanna’im, as there is one who says: A vow that was taken in public has the possibility of nullification by the husband, and therefore, even if the widow takes the vow in public, her husband can nullify it. As a result, she can collect payment of her marriage contract only if she takes a vow before she remarries. And there is one who says: A vow that was taken in public does not have the possibility of nullification. Therefore, even after the widow remarries, she is still able to take a vow and collect payment, as she takes the vow in public. § Since Rav Huna’s statement included the fact that one who requests that a halakhic authority dissolve his vow must detail the vow, the Gemara mentions that a dilemma was raised before the Sages: Does one who comes to a halakhic authority and requests that he dissolve his vow need to detail the vow, or does he not need to do so? Rav Naḥman says: He does not need to detail the vow. Rav Pappa says: He needs to detail the vow. The Gemara explains each one’s reasoning: Rav Naḥman says that he does not need to detail the vow, as if you say that he needs to do so, sometimes the person who took the vow will cut short his statement and not provide all of the details of the vow, and the halakhic authority dissolves only what he hears and does not dissolve the vow in its entirety. Nevertheless, the one who took the vow will act as though the vow has been dissolved entirely. Therefore, it is preferable that he just report that he took a vow, and the halakhic authority will dissolve it entirely, whatever it is. Rav Pappa says that he needs to detail the vow, because the vow might concern a matter that is prohibited, such as the case of the mishna here where it is essential that the vow not be dissolved, as the purpose of the vow is to ensure that the widow will not lie. In such a case, if the halakhic authority is not aware of the circumstances that prompted the widow to take the vow, he could mistakenly dissolve it. The Gemara attempts to bring a proof that one must detail the vow: We learned in a mishna (Bekhorot 45b): A priest who marries women in transgression of a prohibition is disqualified from taking part in the Temple service until he takes a vow not to derive benefit from his wives, thereby requiring him to divorce them. And it is taught with regard to this: He takes a vow and immediately serves in the Temple. He then descends from the service and divorces his wives. And if you say that he does not need to detail the vow, then let us be concerned lest he go to a halakhic authority and the halakhic authority dissolve the vow for him. He would then remain married to the women who are prohibited to him, and serve in the Temple despite being disqualified from doing so.