Chanukah 5780 (Copy)

The Sages taught in a baraita: It is a mitzva to place the Hanukkah lamp at the entrance to one’s house on the outside, so that all can see it. If he lived upstairs, he places it at the window adjacent to the public domain. And in a time of danger, when the gentiles issued decrees to prohibit kindling lights, he places it on the table and that is sufficient to fulfill his obligation.

One who extinguishes the lamp because he is afraid of non-Jews, robbers, or an evil spirit, or so that a sick person may sleep, he is exempt. If [he does so because] he wants to spare the lamp, the oil, or the wick, he is liable. Rabbi Yose exempts in all cases, except for the wick, because he makes charcoal.

With regard to the opinion that one need not rekindle the Hanukkah light if it is extinguished, the Gemara asks: And is it true that if the Hanukkah light is extinguished one is not bound to attend to it? The Gemara raises a contradiction from that which was taught in a baraita: The mitzva of kindling the Hanukkah lights is from sunset until traffic in the marketplace ceases. Does that not mean that if the light is extinguished, he must rekindle it so that it will remain lit for the duration of that period? The Gemara answers: No, the baraita can be understood otherwise: That if one did not yet light at sunset, he may still light the Hanukkah lights until traffic ceases. Alternatively, one could say that this is referring to the matter of its measure. One must prepare a wick and oil sufficient to burn for the period lasting from sunset until traffic ceases. If he did so, even if the light is extinguished beforehand, he need not relight it.

The expression until traffic in the marketplace ceases is mentioned here, and the Gemara asks: Until when exactly is this time? Rabba bar bar Ḥana said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Until the traffic of the people of Tadmor [tarmoda’ei] ceases. They sold kindling wood and remained in the marketplace later than everyone else. People who discovered at sunset that they had exhausted their wood supply could purchase wood from them.

Rav Huna said: A courtyard that has two entrances requires two lamps, one lamp at each entrance, so that it will be obvious that the residents of this courtyard light properly. And Rava said: We only said this in a case where the two entrances face two different directions. However, if they both face in the same direction one need not light at more than one entrance. The Gemara clarifies Rava’s statement: What is the reason for this? If you say that it is because those who see the entrance without a lamp burning will harbor suspicion lest he does not kindle the Hanukkah light, whose suspicion concerns us? If you say that the concern is with regard to the suspicion of people who do not live in the city and are unfamiliar with the courtyard’s tenants, even when both entrances face the same direction let them be required to light at both entrances because visitors are unaware that there are two entrances to that courtyard. And if the concern is with regard to the suspicion of the residents of that city, even when the two entrances face two different directions let them not be required to light at both entrances. The local residents know that only one person lives in the courtyard and will assume that if he did not light at one entrance he surely lit at the other. The Gemara answers: Actually, say that it is because of the suspicion of the residents of that city, and sometimes they pass this entrance and do not pass that one, and they say: Just as he did not light in this entrance, in that second entrance he also did not light. In order to avoid suspicion, it is preferable to light at both entrances.

Rava said: It is obvious to me that there is a fixed list of priorities. When a person is poor and must choose between purchasing oil to light a Shabbat lamp for his home or purchasing oil to light a Hanukkah lamp, the Shabbat lamp for his home takes precedence. That is due to peace in his home; without the light of that lamp, his family would be sitting and eating their meal in the dark. Similarly, if there is a conflict between acquiring oil to light a lamp for his home and wine for the sanctification [kiddush] of Shabbat day, the lamp for his home takes precedence due to peace in his home. However, Rava raised a dilemma: When the conflict is between oil for a Hanukkah lamp or wine for kiddush of Shabbat day, what is the ruling in that case? Does kiddush of Shabbat day take priority because it is frequent, i.e., it is performed every week, and there is a principle: When there is a conflict between a frequent practice and an infrequent practice, the frequent practice takes precedence? Or, perhaps the Hanukkah lamp takes precedence due to publicity of the miracle? After he raised the dilemma, he then resolved it on his own and he ruled that, in that case, the Hanukkah lamp takes precedence due to publicity of the miracle.

We learned there in a mishna with regard to damages: In the case of a spark that emerges from under a hammer, and went out of the artisan’s workshop, and caused damage, the one who struck the hammer is liable. Similarly, in the case of a camel that is laden with flax and it passed through the public domain, and its flax entered into a store, and caught fire from the storekeeper’s lamp, and set fire to the building, the camel owner is liable. Since his flax entered into another’s domain, which he had no permission to enter, all the damages were caused due to his negligence. However, if the storekeeper placed his lamp outside the store and it set fire to the flax, the storekeeper is liable, as he placed the lamp outside his domain where he had no right to place it.

Rabbi Yehuda says: If the flax was set on fire by the storekeeper’s Hanukkah lamp that he placed outside the entrance to his store, he is not liable, as in that case, it is permitted for the storekeeper to place his lamp outside. Ravina said in the name of Rabba: That is to say that it is a mitzva to place the Hanukkah lamp within ten handbreadths of the ground. As if it should enter your mind to say that he may place it above ten handbreadths, why is the storekeeper exempt? Let the camel owner say to the storekeeper: You should have placed the lamp above the height of a camel and its rider, and then no damage would have been caused. By failing to do so, the storekeeper caused the damage, and the camel owner should not be liable. The Gemara rejects this: And perhaps one is also permitted to place the Hanukkah lamp above ten handbreadths, and the reason Rabbi Yehuda exempted the storekeeper was due to concern for the observance of the mitzva of kindling Hanukkah lights. He held that if you burden one excessively, he will come to refrain from performing the mitzva of kindling Hanukkah lights. Since the storekeeper placed the Hanukkah lamp outside at the behest of the Sages, the storekeeper should not be required to take extra precautions.