Makkot 1:3; 1:5

[If they say:] “We testify that so and so is liable to a flogging of forty lashes, and they are found to be perjurers, they receive eighty lashes, because of, “You shall not bear false witness against your neighbor” (Exodus 20:13) and “You shall do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow” (Deuternomy 19:19), these are the words of Rabbi Meir. But the sages say, “They receive only forty lashes.” Monetary impositions are shared among the offenders, but the lashes are not shared among the offenders. How so? If they testified that he owed his friend one hundred zuz, and they were found to be perjurers, they divide the corresponding damages proportionately between them. But if they testified that he was liable to a flogging of forty lashes and were found to be perjurers, each one receives forty lashes.

(16) If a man appears against another to testify maliciously and gives false testimony against him, (17) the two parties to the dispute shall appear before the LORD, before the priests or magistrates in authority at the time, (18) and the magistrates shall make a thorough investigation. If the man who testified is a false witness, if he has testified falsely against his fellow, (19) you shall do to him as he schemed to do to his fellow. Thus you will sweep out evil from your midst; (20) others will hear and be afraid, and such evil things will not again be done in your midst.

They pay with money. The zommemin that are obligated in with [their attempt] to cause payment, pay the money according to the number of the witnesses. If it was three witnesses and they were made zommemin, each one pay a third of the [total] money that they wanted to cause him [the person they are testifying about] to lose.

If other witnesses came, and they charged them [with perjury]: then [again] others came, and they [again] charged them [with perjury], even a hundred, they are all to be executed. Rabbi Judah says: “This is a conspiracy and the first set alone is [to be] executed.”

If other witnesses, i.e., a third set, came and corroborated the testimony of the first set of witnesses, and the second set of witnesses testified that this third set of witnesses were also with them elsewhere that day and rendered them conspiring witnesses, and similarly, if yet other witnesses, i.e., a fourth set, came and corroborated the testimony of the first set of witnesses and the second set rendered them conspiring witnesses, even if one hundred sets of witnesses were all rendered conspiring witnesses by the same second set of witnesses, all of them are executed on the basis of their testimony, as the authority of two witnesses is equivalent to the authority of numerous witnesses. Rabbi Yehuda says: This situation where a set of witnesses renders all the others conspiring witnesses is a conspiracy [istatit], as there is room for suspicion that they simply decided to impeach all witnesses who offer that testimony, and it is only the first set alone that is executed.

It is by divine decree that the Torah has accepted the evidence of the second set of witnesses rather than the first. Even if the first set consisted of a hundred witnesses, and two men came and refuted their evidence, saying to them : "We bear witness that the entire hundred of you were with us that day in such-and-such a place," all of them are punished on the testimony of the two, since the evidence of two is as valid as that of a hundred and the testimony of a hundred is no more effective than that of two. So too, in the case of two sets of witnesses that contradict each other, we do not follow the one that is more numerous but dismiss the evidence of both.

The Gemara asks: If Rabbi Yehuda states that this situation is a conspiracy, and there is suspicion that the second set is not truthful, let even the first set of witnesses who were rendered conspiring witnesses based on their testimony also not be executed. Rabbi Abbahu said: The mishna is referring to a case where the judges already executed the first set of witnesses. Rabbi Yehuda is saying that no witnesses are executed other than the first set of witnesses, who were already executed.

The Gemara challenges: If so, what was, already was; there is no point in stating it as a halakha. Rather, Rava said this is what Rabbi Yehuda is saying: If it is only one set of witnesses that is rendered conspiring witnesses by the second set, the witnesses are executed; if there is more than one set they are not executed at all. The Gemara asks: But doesn’t Rabbi Yehuda say: It is only the first set alone that is executed? This indicates that contrary to Rava’s explanation, it is a case involving more than one set of witnesses. The Gemara notes: Indeed, this matter is difficult.

Apropos the dispute in the mishna, the Gemara relates: There was a certain woman who brought witnesses to testify on her behalf, and they were proven to be liars. She brought other witnesses, and they too were proven to be liars. She went and brought yet other witnesses, who were not proven to be liars. There is an amoraic dispute whether the testimony of the third set of witnesses is accepted. Reish Lakish said: This woman has assumed the presumptive status of dishonesty because of her repeated reliance on false witnesses; therefore, the testimony of the third set is rejected. Rabbi Elazar said to him: If she has assumed the presumptive status of dishonesty, has the entire Jewish people assumed that presumptive status? Why assume that these witnesses are dishonest?

The Gemara relates: On another occasion, Reish Lakish and Rabbi Elazar were sitting before Rabbi Yoḥanan and an incident similar to this one came before them for judgment. Reish Lakish said: This woman has assumed the presumptive status of dishonesty. Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: If she has assumed the presumptive status of dishonesty, has the entire Jewish people assumed that presumptive status? When Reish Lakish heard Rabbi Yoḥanan respond in a manner identical to the earlier response of Rabbi Elazar, he turned his head and glared angrily at Rabbi Elazar, and he said to him: You heard this matter from bar Nappaḥa, i.e., Rabbi Yoḥanan, and you did not say it to me in his name? Had I known that you were stating Rabbi Yoḥanan’s opinion I would have accepted it.