יהודים ונכרים בספרות חז"ל - מכללת אחוה תשפ"ב דף מס. 7: הבחנות אתניות ודתיות א-בינאריות בספרות חז"ל

(1) This mishna sets out the essential halakhot pertaining to the invitation to recite Grace after Meals after a joint meal [zimmun]: Three people who ate as one are required to form a zimmun and recite Grace after Meals. If, among the diners, one ate doubtfully tithed produce [demai], and first tithe from which its teruma was already taken, or second tithe, and consecrated food that were redeemed and therefore permitted to be eaten; and even the waiter who served the meal to the diners and who ate at least an olive-bulk from the meal, and the Samaritan [Kuti] who ate with two others at a meal; each of these people is included among the three to obligate those with whom they ate in a zimmun. However, one who ate untithed produce [tevel], and first tithe from which its teruma was not separated, and second tithe, and consecrated food that were not redeemed, and the waiter who did not eat an olive-bulk, and the gentile who ate with two Jews, none of these people is included among the three to obligate those with whom they ate in a zimmun.

(4) One who takes his wheat to a Samaritan miller or to an am haaretz miller, [the wheat when ground] retains its former status in respect of tithes and the law of seventh year produce. [But if he carried it] to a Gentile miller, [the wheat when ground has the status of] demai. One who deposited his produce with a Samaritan or am haaretz, [the produce] retains its former status in respect of tithes and the law of seventh year produce. [But if he left it] with a Gentile, it is like the produce of the Gentile. Rabbi Shimon says: [it becomes] demai.

(10) One who takes a vow that deriving benefit from those who rest on Shabbat is forbidden to him is prohibited from deriving benefit from a Jew, and he is also prohibited from deriving benefit from Samaritans [Kutim] because they are also Shabbat observers. One who takes a vow that deriving benefit from those who eat garlic on Shabbat night is forbidden to him is prohibited from deriving benefit from a Jew, and he is also prohibited from benefiting from Samaritans. However, if one takes a vow that deriving benefit from those who ascend to Jerusalem is forbidden to him, he is prohibited from deriving benefit from a Jew, but he is permitted to benefit from Samaritans because they do not ascend to Jerusalem, but rather, to Mount Gerizim.

(1) The Sages dissolved four types of vows without the requirement of a request to a halakhic authority: Vows of exhortation, vows of exaggeration, vows that are unintentional, and vows whose fulfillment is impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control. The mishna explains: Vows of exhortation are those by which one encourages another using vow terminology that is exaggerated. How so? One was selling an item and said: I will not lower the price for you to less than a sela, as that is konam, forbidden as if it were an offering, for me. And the other one, the buyer, says: I will not raise my payment to you to more than a shekel, as that is konam for me. In this case, one may assume that both want to complete the deal at three dinars, and they did not intend to vow but only exaggerated for purposes of bargaining. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Even one who wants to take a vow prohibiting another from benefiting from him, but only in order that he should eat with him, not intending to take an actual vow, should say to him at the outset: Any vow that I take in the future is void. And this statement is effective, provided that he remembers at the time of the vow that his intent at the beginning of the year was to render it void.

(2) Vows of exaggeration that the Sages dissolved without a request to a halakhic authority, as described in the first mishna in the chapter, include the following examples. If one said concerning a certain item: It is konam for me if I did not see on this road as many people as those who ascended from Egypt, or if he said: It is konam for me if I did not see a snake as large as the beam of an olive press, in these cases the speaker did not intend to vow but used hyperbole to demonstrate a point, and it is understood by others that the expression is not to be taken literally. What are examples of vows that are unintentional that are dissolved, as taught at the beginning of the chapter? One who vows: This loaf is forbidden to me as if it were an offering [konam] if I ate or if I drank, and then he remembers that he ate or drank. Or, one who vows: This loaf is konam for me if I will eat or if I will drink, and he then forgets and eats or drinks. Also, one who said: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife because she stole my purse or she hit my son, and then it became known that she had not hit him or it became known that she had not stolen. The mishna lists another example of an unintentional vow: One who saw people entering his courtyard and eating figs, and because he did not want them to do so he said: The figs are forbidden to you like an offering. And then it was found that his father and brother were in the group, and there were others with them as well, and certainly he did not intend to take a vow prohibiting his father and brother from eating the figs. In such a case, Beit Shammai says: They, his father and brother, are permitted to eat the figs, and those others that were with them are prohibited from doing so. And Beit Hillel says: Both these and those are permitted to eat the figs, as will be clarified in the Gemara.

(3) What are examples of vows impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control? If one’s friend took a vow with regard to him that he should eat with him, and he became sick, or his son became sick, or a river that he was unable to cross barred him from coming, these are examples of vows whose fulfillment are impeded by circumstances beyond one’s control. They are not binding and do not require dissolution.

(4) One may take a vow to murderers, i.e., people suspected of killing others over monetary matters; or to robbers [ḥaramin]; or to tax collectors who wish to collect tax, that the produce in his possession is teruma although it is not teruma. One may also take a vow to them that the produce in his possession belongs to the house of the king, although it does not belong to the house of the king. One may take a false vow to save himself or his possessions, as a statement of this sort does not have the status of a vow. Beit Shammai say: One may vow in such a case, although he has no intention that his words be true, using every means of taking a vow or making a prohibition in order to mislead those people, except for by taking of an oath, due to its more stringent nature. And Beit Hillel say: One may mislead them even by taking an oath. Beit Shammai say: When negotiating with a robber, one should not initiate by taking a vow for him unless the robber does not believe his claim, in which case he may take a vow to reinforce his words. And Beit Hillel say: He may even initiate by taking a vow to him. Beit Shammai say: One may take a vow only about that which the robber compels him to take a vow but may not add to it. And Beit Hillel say: One may take a vow even about that which he does not compel him to take a vow. The mishna explains the previous statement: How so? If the extortionist said to him that he should say: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife if the vow is not true, and he said: Benefiting from me is konam for my wife and my children, Beit Shammai say: His wife is permitted to benefit from him, since the extortionist demanded that he take that vow, but his children, whom he added of his own accord, are prohibited from benefiting from their father. And Beit Hillel say: Both these and those are permitted to benefit from him.

(5) If one sees his property in danger of being destroyed, and takes a vow stating, for example: These saplings are like an offering if they are not cut down, or: This garment is like an offering if it is not burned, these items are consecrated if the saplings remain standing or if the garment is not burned. In addition, they are subject to the possibility of redemption just as other items consecrated for maintenance of the Temple may be redeemed. But if one said: These saplings are like an offering until they are cut down, or: This garment is like an offering until it is burned, then they are not subject to the possibility of redemption.

(6) In the case of one who takes a vow that he will not derive benefit from seafarers, he is permitted to benefit from those who live on dry land. But if he takes a vow not to derive benefit from those who live on dry land, he is also prohibited from deriving benefit from seafarers, because seafarers are included within the category of those who live on dry land. The mishna now defines seafarers: Not like those that travel by ship from Akko to Jaffa, which is a short trip, but rather one who customarily departs [lefaresh] to distant locations, e.g., foreign countries.

(7) One who takes a vow not to derive benefit from those who see the sun is prohibited from deriving benefit even from the blind, although they see nothing. This is because he meant only to include all those that the sun sees, i.e., shines upon with light.

(8) One who takes a vow not to derive benefit from those that have dark heads [sheḥorei harosh] is prohibited from deriving benefit from those that are bald, although they have no hair at all, and from the elderly who have white hair. This is because the term is not to be understood in its simple meaning but rather in a broader manner. But he is permitted to derive benefit from women and from children, because only men are called: Those with dark heads.

(9) One who takes a vow not to derive benefit from those that are born [yeludim] is permitted to derive benefit from those who will be born [noladim] after the time of the vow. But if one takes a vow not to derive benefit from those who will be born, he is also prohibited from deriving benefit from those that are already born at the time of the vow. Rabbi Meir permits deriving benefit even from those that are already born at the time of the vow because he holds that the one taking the vow was precise in prohibiting only those that will be born. And the Rabbis say: He intended to include with this expression only one whose nature is to be born. Therefore, both those who will be born and those who were already born are included in the vow.

(10) One who takes a vow that deriving benefit from those who rest on Shabbat is forbidden to him is prohibited from deriving benefit from a Jew, and he is also prohibited from deriving benefit from Samaritans [Kutim] because they are also Shabbat observers. One who takes a vow that deriving benefit from those who eat garlic on Shabbat night is forbidden to him is prohibited from deriving benefit from a Jew, and he is also prohibited from benefiting from Samaritans. However, if one takes a vow that deriving benefit from those who ascend to Jerusalem is forbidden to him, he is prohibited from deriving benefit from a Jew, but he is permitted to benefit from Samaritans because they do not ascend to Jerusalem, but rather, to Mount Gerizim.

(11) If one says: The property of the descendants of Noah is konam for me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, he is permitted to derive benefit from a Jew but prohibited from deriving benefit from the nations of the world. If one says: The property of the offspring of Abraham is forbidden to me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, he is prohibited from deriving benefit from a Jew but permitted to derive benefit from the nations of the world. If one says: The property of a Jew is forbidden to me, and for that reason I will not benefit from it, he may purchase items from a Jew for more than the market price and may sell items to a Jew for less than the market price, so that he does not derive benefit from the transactions. If one says: Benefit from me is forbidden to a Jew, he may purchase items from a Jew for less than the market price and may sell items to a Jew for more than the market price, so that he does not derive benefit from the transactions. But although this would be permitted, they do not listen to him, i.e., people will generally not agree to deal with him in a manner that causes them a loss in every transaction. If one says: The property of a Jew is forbidden to me, and for that reason I will not benefit from them, and my property is forbidden to a Jew and they will not benefit from me, in this case he may benefit from the nations of the world but not from a Jew, and a Jew may not benefit from him. If one says: Benefiting from those who are uncircumcised is konam for me, he is permitted to derive benefit from uncircumcised Jews because they are not regarded as uncircumcised, but he is prohibited from deriving benefit from the circumcised of the nations of the world. Conversely, if he said: Benefiting from those who are circumcised is konam for me, he is prohibited from deriving benefit even from uncircumcised Jews and he is permitted to derive benefit from the circumcised of the nations of the world, as the term uncircumcised is used only to name the nations of the world, as it is stated: “For all the nations are uncircumcised, but all the house of Israel are uncircumcised in the heart” (Jeremiah 9:25), and it says: “And this uncircumcised Philistine shall be” (I Samuel 17:36), and it says: “Lest the daughters of the Philistines rejoice, lest the daughters of the uncircumcised triumph” (II Samuel 1:20). These verses indicate that ordinary gentiles are referred to as uncircumcised, regardless of whether they are actually circumcised. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: The foreskin is repulsive, as is evident from the fact that the wicked are disgraced through it, as it is stated: “Behold, the days come, says the Lord, that I will punish all them that are circumcised in their uncircumcision: Egypt, and Judah, and Edom, and the children of Ammon, and Moab, and all that have the corners of their hair polled, that dwell in the wilderness; for all the nations are uncircumcised, but all the house of Israel are uncircumcised in the heart” (Jeremiah 9:25), which indicates that there is an element of disgrace associated with the foreskin. Rabbi Yishmael says: So great is the mitzva of circumcision that thirteen covenants were sealed with regard to it, for the word covenant appears thirteen times in the biblical passage that discusses circumcision (Genesis, chapter 17). Rabbi Yosei says: So great is the mitzva of circumcision that it overrides the strict halakhot of Shabbat, as circumcision is performed even if the eighth day following the birth of a son occurs on Shabbat, despite the fact that circumcision violates the prohibition of labor on Shabbat. Rabbi Yehoshua ben Korḥa says: Great is the mitzva of circumcision, as is evident from the fact that the punishment of Moses the righteous for not circumcising his son when he was capable of doing so was not postponed for even a full hour (see Exodus 4:24–26). Rabbi Neḥemya says: So great is the mitzva of circumcision that it overrides the prohibitions associated with leprosy. If leprosy is found on the foreskin of an infant, although it is generally prohibited to cut the afflicted area, it is permitted to do so to perform the mitzva of circumcision. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: So great is the mitzva of circumcision that despite all the mitzvot that Abraham our Patriarch did, he was not called wholehearted until he circumcised himself, as it is stated at the time that the mitzva was given to him: “Walk before Me and you should be wholehearted” (Genesis 17:1). Alternatively, so great is the mitzva of circumcision that if not for it the Holy One, Blessed be He, would not have created His world, as it is stated: “Thus says the Lord: If My covenant be not with day and night, I would not have appointed the ordinances of heaven and earth” (Jeremiah 33:25), and the covenant that exists day and night is the covenant of circumcision, as it is always found on the person’s body.

(1) Samaritan girls are considered menstruating women from the time they lie in their cradle. And the Samaritan men impart ritual impurity to the lower bedding like the upper bedding, i.e., all layers of bedding beneath them are impure, and their status is like the bedding above a man who experiences a gonorrhea-like discharge [zav]: The status of both levels of bedding is that of first-degree ritual impurity, which can impart impurity to food and drink. This is due to the fact that Samaritan men are considered men who engage in intercourse with menstruating women. And they are considered men who engage in intercourse with menstruating women because Samaritan women observe the seven-day menstrual period of ritual impurity for each and every emission of blood, even for blood that does not render them impure. Accordingly, if a Samaritan woman has an emission of impure blood during the seven-day period, she will nevertheless continue counting seven days from the first emission. It is therefore possible that the Samaritan men will engage in intercourse with their wives while they are still halakhically considered menstruating women, as the seven-day period of impurity should have been counted from the emission of the impure blood. But one who enters the Temple while wearing those garments upon which a Samaritan had lain is not liable to bring an offering for entering the Temple in a status of impurity, nor does one burn teruma that came into contact with those garments, because their impurity is uncertain.

(2) With regard to Sadducee girls, when they were accustomed to follow in the ways of their Sadducee ancestors their status is like that of Samaritan women, whose halakha was discussed in the previous mishna. If the Sadducee women abandoned the customs of their ancestors in order to follow in the ways of the Jewish people their status is like that of a Jewish woman. Rabbi Yosei says: Their status is always like that of a Jewish woman, until they will abandon the ways of the Jewish people in order to follow in the ways of their Sadducee ancestors.

(3) With regard to the blood of a menstruating gentile woman or a gentile zava, and the blood discharged by a female Jewish leper during the days of purity of a woman who gives birth, Beit Shammai deem them ritually pure, and Beit Hillel say: The halakhic status of the blood of the gentile woman is like that of her saliva and her urine, which impart impurity only while moist. Likewise, the blood discharged by a Jewish leper during the days of purity imparts impurity only when moist. With regard to the blood of a woman who gave birth and reached the conclusion of her days of impurity, i.e., seven days after giving birth to a male or fourteen days after giving birth to a female, but who did not yet immerse in a ritual bath, Beit Shammai say: Although she has yet to immerse in a ritual bath, the blood does not retain the halakhic status of menstrual blood. Rather, the status of the blood is like that of her saliva and her urine, and it imparts impurity only while moist. And Beit Hillel say: Since she did not immerse in a ritual bath, her blood is considered like that of a menstruating woman, and it imparts impurity whether it is moist or dry. And Beit Shammai concede to Beit Hillel in the case of a woman who gives birth as a zava, where the woman must count seven clean days from the conclusion of her days of impurity, that any blood she sees during those seven days imparts impurity whether it is moist or dry.

(4) With regard to a pregnant woman who experiences labor pains, and they are accompanied by an emission of blood, her status is that of a menstruating woman. If she experienced these pains accompanied by emissions of blood for three consecutive days within the eleven days between periods of menstruation, during which time emissions of blood render a woman a zava, and she rested from labor for a twenty-four-hour period, i.e., the pangs subsided, and she then gave birth, it indicates that the emissions were not due to her imminent labor, and this woman is considered one who gives birth as a zava. This is the statement of Rabbi Eliezer. Rabbi Yehoshua says: She is considered a zava only if the pangs subsided for a twenty-four-hour period of a night and the following day, like Shabbat evening and its accompanying day. Additionally, she is considered a zava in a case where she rested from the pain of labor but not necessarily from the flow of blood. In other words, the presence of labor pangs determines whether this blood is due to labor or the impure blood of ziva. Accordingly, if the pangs cease for twenty-four hours, she is considered a zava even if blood was discharging continuously from when she experienced her labor pains.

(5) How long before birth is pain attributable to her labor pains, which means that the blood is not considered blood of ziva? Rabbi Meir says: Even forty or fifty days before the birth, any blood she sees during the eleven days of ziva is not considered blood of ziva. Rabbi Yehuda says: It is sufficient that this halakha applies only from within one month of her due date. Rabbi Yosei and Rabbi Shimon say: Labor pains do not occur more than two weeks before birth. Accordingly, if she experiences bleeding for three consecutive days during eleven days of ziva that occur before this time, she is a zava.

(6) A woman who experiences labor pains within eighty days of giving birth to a female, e.g., she conceived during the sixty-six days of purity, or she initially conceived twins and she gave birth to a female and the birth of the second fetus was delayed, all blood that she sees is ritually pure, as she is currently within her days of purity. And this remains the halakha until the child emerges from the womb, at which point she is rendered impure as a woman who gives birth. And Rabbi Eliezer deems ritually impure the blood that occurs due to these labor pains. The Rabbis said to Rabbi Eliezer: And what, if in an instance where the verse was stringent with regard to blood emitted while resting, namely if a pregnant woman emits blood after her days of purity without any labor pains she is rendered impure, the verse was lenient with regard to blood that accompanies the labor pains; then in an instance where the verse was lenient with regard to blood emitted while resting, i.e., during a woman’s days of purity, is it not right that we will be lenient with regard to blood that accompanies the labor pains? Rabbi Eliezer said to them: When deriving a halakha by means of an a fortiori inference, there is a principle that it is sufficient for the conclusion that emerges from an a fortiori inference to be like its source. In other words, the status of blood emitted due to labor pains during her days of purity should not be more lenient than that of blood emitted due to labor pains after her days of purity. Rabbi Eliezer elaborates: Concerning what type of impurity was the verse lenient with regard to a woman who experiences an emission of blood due to labor pains? Concerning the impurity of ziva. But she may still be rendered ritually impure with the impurity of a menstruating woman. So too, if a woman experiences emissions of blood due to labor pains during her days of purity, she is rendered a menstruating woman.

(7) For all the eleven days of ziva that follow the seven days of menstruation, a woman has the presumptive status of ritual purity, as it is unusual for her to experience bleeding on these days. If a woman sat and did not examine herself every morning and evening to determine whether she emitted blood and is impure, it makes no difference whether she failed to examine herself unwittingly or due to circumstances beyond her control, or even if she acted intentionally and did not examine herself; she remains ritually pure. She is rendered impure only if she examined herself and was found to have emitted blood. By contrast, if the time of her menstrual cycle arrived, when she is required to examine herself, and she did not examine herself, that woman is ritually impure, as it is typical for a woman to discharge blood at that time. Rabbi Meir says: If a woman was in hiding from danger, and the time of her menstrual cycle arrived and she did not examine herself on that day, that woman is pure, because fear drives away blood. There is therefore no concern that she might have emitted blood. But with regard to the seven clean days of the zav and the zava, and with regard to a woman who observes a clean day for a day she experiences a discharge during her days of ziva, if she fails to examine herself on those days, these women have a presumptive status of ritual impurity, as they already experienced a discharge.

(1) One who resides with a gentile in the same courtyard, or one who lives in the same courtyard with one who does not accept the principle of eiruv, even though he is not a gentile, such as a Samaritan [Kuti], this person renders it prohibited for him to carry from his own house into the courtyard or from the courtyard into his house, unless he rents this person’s rights in the courtyard, as will be explained below. Rabbi Eliezer ben Ya’akov says: Actually, the gentile does not render it prohibited for one to carry, unless there are two Jews living in the same courtyard who themselves would prohibit one another from carrying if there were no eiruv. In such a case, the presence of the gentile renders the eiruv ineffective. However, if only one Jew lives there, the gentile does not render it prohibited for him to carry in the courtyard.

(2) Rabban Gamliel said: There was an incident involving a certain Sadducee who lived with us in the same alleyway in Jerusalem, who renounced his rights to the alleyway before Shabbat. And Father said to us: Hurry and take out your utensils to the alleyway to establish possession of it, before he changes his mind and takes out his own utensils so as to reclaim his rights, in which case he would render it prohibited for you to use the entire alleyway. Rabbi Yehuda says: Rabban Gamliel’s father spoke to them with a different formulation, saying: Hurry and do whatever you must do in the alleyway prior to Shabbat, before he takes out his utensils and renders it prohibited for you to use the alleyway. In other words, you may not bring out utensils to the alleyway at all on Shabbat, as the institution of an eiruv cannot be used in the neighborhood of a Sadducee. This is because, even if he renounced his rights to the alleyway, he can always retract and reclaim them.

(3) If one of the residents of a courtyard forgot and did not participate in an eiruv with the other residents before Shabbat, and on Shabbat he renounced his rights in the courtyard to the other residents, his house is prohibited both to him, who forgot to establish an eiruv, and to them, the other residents, to bring in objects from the courtyard to his house or to take them out from his house into the courtyard. But their houses are permitted both to him and to them, for taking objects out into the courtyard and for bringing them in. If they gave away their rights in the courtyard to him, i.e., if they renounced their rights in his favor, he is permitted to carry from his house into the courtyard, but they are prohibited from doing so. If two residents of the courtyard forgot to establish an eiruv, and the others renounced their rights in the courtyard in their favor, they prohibit one another. In this scenario, the courtyard would belong to both of them, but each individual house remains the domain of its owner. It would therefore be prohibited for each of these residents to carry into the courtyard. For one resident may give away and receive rights in a domain, whereas two residents may only give away rights in a domain, but they may not receive rights in a domain. Since they did not establish an eiruv, it is unreasonable for the other residents of the courtyard to give away their rights in the domain, as the two who are prohibited because they did not participate in the eiruv render it prohibited for each other to carry.

(4) The mishna poses a general question: When may one give away rights in a domain? Beit Shammai say: While it is still day, i.e., before the onset of Shabbat; and Beit Hillel say: Even after nightfall, when it is already Shabbat. The mishna cites another dispute: If one gave away his rights in his courtyard to the other residents of the courtyard, renouncing them after having forgotten to establish an eiruv with them the previous day, and then he carried something out from his house into the courtyard – whether unwittingly, forgetting that he had renounced his rights, or intentionally, he renders carrying prohibited for all the residents of the courtyard, for his action cancels his renunciation; this is the statement of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: If he acted intentionally, he renders carrying prohibited; but if he acted unwittingly, he does not render carrying prohibited.

(5) If a homeowner was in partnership with his neighbors, with this one in wine and with that one in wine, they need not establish an eiruv, for due to their authentic partnership they are considered to be one household, and no further partnership is required. If, however, he was in partnership with this one in wine and with that one in oil, they must establish an eiruv. As they are not partners in the same item, they are not all considered one partnership. Rabbi Shimon says: In both this case and that case, i.e., even if he partners with his neighbors in different items, they need not establish an eiruv.

(6) With regard to five groups of people who spent Shabbat in one hall [teraklin] that was subdivided by partitions into separate rooms, each of which had a separate entrance to a courtyard that was shared with other houses, Beit Shammai say: An eiruv is required for each and every group, i.e., each group must contribute separately to the eiruv of the courtyard, as each is considered a different house. And Beit Hillel say: One eiruv suffices for all of them, as the partitions do not render the different sections separate houses. And Beit Hillel concede that when some of them occupy separate rooms or upper stories, they require a separate eiruv for each and every group, and the fact that they are in the same building does not render them one unified group.

(7) In the case of brothers who were eating at their father’s table and sleeping in their own houses in the same courtyard, a separate contribution to the eiruv is required for each and every one of them. Therefore, if one of them forgot and did not contribute to the eiruv, he must renounce his rights in the courtyard in order to render carrying in the courtyard permitted to the rest of the courtyard’s residents. When do they state this halakha? They state it when they take their eiruv elsewhere in the courtyard, i.e., to the house of one of the other residents. But if the eiruv was coming to them, i.e., if it was placed in their father’s house, or if there are no other residents with the brothers and their father in the courtyard, they are not required to establish an eiruv, as they are considered like a single individual living in a courtyard.

(8) If five courtyards open into one another and also open into an alleyway, the following distinctions apply: If the residents of the courtyard established an eiruv in the courtyards and did not merge the courtyards that open into the alleyway, they are permitted to carry in the courtyards and they are prohibited to carry in the alleyway. The eiruv they established cannot also serve as a merging of the courtyards that open into the alleyway. And if they merged the courtyards of the alleyway, they are permitted to carry both here, in the alleyway, and there, in the courtyards. If they established an eiruv in the courtyards and also merged the courtyards of the alleyway, and one of the residents of the courtyard forgot and did not contribute to the eiruv in his courtyard, but did participate in the merging of the courtyards in the alleyway, they are permitted both here and there, as the merging of courtyards in the alleyway serves as an effective eiruv for the courtyards as well. However, if one of the residents of the alleyway forgot and did not participate in the merging of courtyards that open into the alleyway, they are permitted to carry in the courtyards and prohibited from carrying in the alleyway, as the principle is: An alleyway is to its courtyards as a courtyard is to its houses.

(9) With regard to two courtyards, one of which was within the other, and the outer one opened into the public domain, the following distinctions apply: If the inner courtyard established an eiruv for itself and the outer one did not establish an eiruv, carrying in the inner one is permitted and carrying in the outer one is prohibited. If the outer courtyard established an eiruv and the inner one did not, carrying in both is prohibited, as the residents of the inner courtyard pass through the outer one, and are considered to a certain extent as residents of the courtyard who did not participate in the eiruv. If this courtyard established an eiruv for itself, and that courtyard also established an eiruv for itself, but they did not establish a joint eiruv with one another, this one is permitted by itself, and that one is permitted by itself, but they may not carry from one to the other. Rabbi Akiva prohibits carrying in the outer one even in such a case, as the right of entry to the outer courtyard enjoyed by the residents of the inner courtyard renders it prohibited. And the Rabbis disagree and say: The right of entry enjoyed by the residents of the inner courtyard does not render it prohibited. Since the residents of the inner courtyard do not use the outer one other than to pass through it, and they are permitted to carry in their own courtyard, they do not render it prohibited to carry in the outer courtyard.

(10) If one resident of the outer courtyard forgot and did not contribute to the eiruv, carrying in the inner courtyard is permitted and in the outer one is prohibited. If one resident of the inner courtyard forgot and did not contribute to the eiruv, they are both prohibited, as the right of way enjoyed by the members of the inner courtyard through the outer courtyard renders the outer one prohibited as well. If the residents of both courtyards put their eiruv in one place, and one person, whether he was from the inner courtyard or from the outer one, forgot and did not contribute to the eiruv, they are both prohibited for carrying within them, as the two courtyards are treated as one. And if the courtyards belonged to individuals, i.e., if only one person lived in each courtyard, they are not required to establish an eiruv, as this requirement applies only to a courtyard occupied by multiple residents.

(4) These bring [bikkurim] but do not read the declaration:The convert, since he cannot say: “Which the Lord has sworn to our fathers, to give to us” (Deuteronomy 26:3). If his mother was an Israelite, then he brings bikkurim and recites. When he prays privately, he says: “God of the fathers of Israel,” but when he is in the synagogue, he should say: “The God of your fathers.” But if his mother was an Israelite, he says: “The God of our fathers’.

(4) On that day Judah, an Ammonite convert, came and stood before them in the house of study. He said to them: Do I have the right to enter into the assembly? Rabban Gamaliel said to him: you are forbidden. Rabbi Joshua said to him: you are permitted. Rabban Gamaliel said to him: the verse says, "An Ammonite or a Moabite shall not enter into the assembly of the Lord: even to the tenth generation" (Deuteronomy 23:4). R. Joshua said to him: But are the Ammonites and Moabites still in their own territory? Sanheriv, the king of Assyria, has long since come up and mingled all the nations, as it is said: "In that I have removed the bounds of the peoples, and have robbed their treasures, and have brought down as one mighty the inhabitants" (Isaiah 10:1. Rabban Gamaliel said to him: the verse says, "But afterward I will bring back the captivity of the children of Ammon," (Jeremiah 49:6) they have already returned. Rabbi Joshua said to him: [another] verse says, "I will return the captivity of my people Israel and Judah" (Jeremiah 30:3). Yet they have not yet returned. So they permitted him to enter the assembly.

(12) Whether referring to a person’s wages that he receives or the renting of an animal or the renting of utensils, are all subject to the prohibition of: “On the same day you shall give him his wages” (Deuteronomy 24:15), and are subject to the prohibition of: “The wages of a hired laborer shall not remain with you all night until the morning” (Leviticus 19:13). When does he transgress these prohibitions? He transgresses them when the one owed the money claimed the payment from him. If he did not claim his payment from him the other does not transgress the prohibitions. If the one who owes the money transferred his payment by leaving instructions with a storekeeper or with a money changer to pay him, he does not transgress the prohibitions. The mishna discusses other related halakhot: If a hired laborer requests payment at the proper time and the employer claims he already paid him, the laborer takes an oath that he did not receive his wages and then takes the wages from the employer. If the time had passed, he does not take an oath and take the wages. If there are witnesses who testify that he claimed the money from him at the proper time, he takes an oath and takes the money. One who hires a gentile who resides in Eretz Yisrael and observes the seven Noahide mitzvot [ger toshav] is subject to the prohibition of: “On the same day you shall give him his wages,” but is not subject to the negative mitzva of: “The wages of a hired laborer shall not remain with you all night until the morning.”