תניא ר' שמעון בן אלעזר אומר כל מי שיש לו מעות ומלוה אותם שלא ברבית עליו הכתוב אומר (תהלים טו, ה) כספו לא נתן בנשך ושוחד על נקי לא לקח עושה אלה לא ימוט לעולם הא למדת שכל המלוה ברבית נכסיו מתמוטטין והא קא חזינן דלא מוזפי ברבית וקא מתמוטטין אמר רבי אלעזר הללו מתמוטטין ועולין והללו מתמוטטין ואינן עולין
to teach that one may lend money with interest to a ger toshav only to the extent required to provide a livelihood to the lender, but not to do so as a regular business. Ravina said: Here in the mishna we are dealing with Torah scholars, for whom it is permitted to lend money to a gentile with interest. The Gemara explains: What is the reason the Sages decreed that one should not lend money to a gentile with interest? The reason is that perhaps the Jew will learn from the gentile’s actions. Continuous interactions with gentiles for the sake of financial dealings may have a negative influence on a Jew. And since in this case the lender is a Torah scholar, he will not learn from the gentile’s actions. There are those who teach that which Rav Huna said in connection with that which Rav Yosef taught: The verse states: “If you lend money to any of My people, even to the poor person who is with you” (Exodus 22:24). The term “My people” teaches that if one of My people, i.e., a Jew, and a gentile both come to borrow money from you, My people take precedence. The term “the poor person” teaches that if a poor person and a rich person come to borrow money, the poor person takes precedence. And from the term: “Who is with you,” it is derived: If your poor person, meaning one of your relatives, and one of the poor of your city come to borrow money, your poor person takes precedence. If it is between one of the poor of your city and one of the poor of another city, the one of the poor of your city takes precedence. The Master said above: If one of My people and a gentile come to you for a loan, My people take precedence. The Gemara asks: Isn’t this obvious? Is there any reason to think that a gentile would take precedence over a Jew? Rav Naḥman said that Rav Huna said to me: It is necessary only to teach that even if the choice is to lend money to a gentile with interest or to a Jew for free, without interest, one must still give preference to the Jew and lend the money to him, even though this will entail a lack of profit. It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yosei says: Come and see the blindness in the eyes of those who lend money with interest. If a person calls another a wicked person in public, the other becomes insulted and he harasses him in all aspects of his life because he called him by this disgraceful name. But they who lend with interest bring witnesses and a scribe [velavlar] and a pen [vekulmos] and ink and write and sign a document that testifies: So-and-so denies the existence of the God of Israel, as the very fact that he lent with interest in defiance of the Torah is tantamount to a denial of the existence of God. It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Shimon ben Elazar says: Concerning anyone who has money and lends it without interest, the verse says about him: “He who has not given his money with interest and who has not taken a bribe against the innocent, he who does these shall never collapse” (Psalms 15:5). From this statement, the opposite can also be inferred: You learn from this that concerning anyone who lends his money to others with interest, his property, i.e., his financial standing, collapses. The Gemara asks: But we see people who do not lend money with interest and nevertheless their property collapses. Rabbi Elazar says: There is still a difference: Those who do not lend money with interest collapse but then ultimately rise, but these, who lend with interest, collapse and do not rise again. Referring to the subject of honest people who collapse temporarily, it is said: “Why do You observe the treacherous, and remain silent while the wicked swallows the one who is more righteous than he?” (Habakkuk 1:13). Rav Huna says about this verse: One who is more righteous than he, he swallows for the moment, but he does not swallow a completely righteous person at all. § The Gemara returns to the clarification of the mishna, which mentioned the subject of a gentile who resides in Eretz Yisrael and observes the seven Noahide mitzvot [ger toshav]. It is taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: With regard to the convert that is mentioned concerning the sale of a Hebrew slave and the ger toshav that is mentioned concerning interest, I do not know what the meaning of each of these references is. The Gemara explains: The convert that is mentioned concerning the sale of a Hebrew slave is referring to the following, as it is written: “If your brother waxes poor with you and is sold unto you” (Leviticus 25:39), and it was expounded in a baraita: And not only will he be sold to you, a born Jew, but he will be sold even to a convert, as it is stated: “And sells himself to a stranger [leger]” (Leviticus 25:47). And this sale to a ger is referring to a sale not only to a righteous convert [leger tzedek], but even to a ger toshav, as it is stated: “And sells himself to a stranger who is a settler [leger toshav]” (Leviticus 25:47). With regard to the continuation of the verse: “Or to an offshoot of a stranger’s family,” this is referring to a gentile, i.e., he will reach a state where he has no choice but to sell himself to a gentile. When it states: “Or to an offshoot of a stranger’s family,” this is referring to one sold for idol worship itself, i.e., he is forced to sell himself as a slave to work in a temple of idol worship. The Gemara clarifies the baraita. The Master said: And not only will he be sold to you, a born Jew, but he will be sold even to a convert, as it is stated: “And sells himself to a stranger.” Is this to say that a convert may acquire a Hebrew slave? The Gemara raises a contradiction from a baraita: A convert cannot be acquired as a Hebrew slave, and a woman or a convert may not acquire a Hebrew slave. The Gemara explains the baraita. A convert cannot be acquired as a Hebrew slave, as we require the fulfillment of the verse: “Then he shall go out from you, he and his children with him, and shall return to his own family” (Leviticus 25:41), and a convert is not able to do this, since upon conversion the convert severs his relationship with his gentile family, and he therefore has no family. The baraita teaches: And a woman or a convert may not acquire a Hebrew slave. With regard to a woman, the reason is that it is not proper conduct, since people may say that she is purchasing him to engage in sexual intercourse with him. With regard to a convert as well, it is learned as a tradition: Only one who can be acquired as a Hebrew slave can acquire a Hebrew slave, and one who cannot be acquired as a Hebrew slave cannot acquire a Hebrew slave. Since a convert cannot be acquired as a Hebrew slave, he also cannot acquire one. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s question was that since it has been established that a convert may not acquire a Hebrew slave, why was he mentioned in the verse? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: He cannot acquire a Hebrew slave and have his halakha be like that of a Jew who owns a Hebrew slave, but he can acquire a Hebrew slave and have his halakha be like that of a gentile who owns a Hebrew slave. This is as it is taught in a baraita: A Hebrew slave who had his ear pierced by his own request in order to remain a slave after his six-year period of servitude was over, and therefore is emancipated only during the Jubilee Year, and also a Hebrew slave who was sold to a gentile, does not serve his master’s son and does not serve his master’s daughter after his master’s death, but rather is emancipated. The same halakha would apply to a Hebrew slave sold to a convert, whose status in this respect is similar to that of a gentile. The Master said above: And a woman or a convert may not acquire a Hebrew slave. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this baraita is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel. As it is taught in a baraita: A woman may acquire maidservants but may not acquire male slaves, in order to preserve standards of modesty. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: She may also acquire male slaves. The Gemara rejects this suggestion: Even if you say that this baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel, it is not difficult. Here, where it is prohibited, the ruling is stated with regard to a Hebrew slave, and there, where Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel renders it permitted, the ruling is stated with regard to a Canaanite slave. The Gemara explains the difference: A Hebrew slave is regarded as discreet in her eyes, and since she trusts that a Hebrew slave will not reveal their actions to others if they engage in sexual intercourse, it is prohibited for her to acquire a male Hebrew slave. By contrast, a Canaanite slave is regarded as indiscreet in her eyes, so she will be deterred from transgressing with him. The Gemara asks: But this seems to contradict the baraita that Rav Yosef teaches: A widow may not raise a dog, due to suspicion that she may engage in bestiality, and she may not allow a student of Torah to dwell as a lodger in her home. Granted, it makes sense that it is prohibited for her to have a student of Torah lodging in her home, as he is regarded as discreet in her eyes. But concerning a dog, since it would follow her around afterward if she would engage in bestiality with it, she is afraid to sin with it. Therefore, it should be permitted for her to raise it. The Sages say in response: Since it will also follow her around if she throws it a piece of meat [umtza], people will say: It is following her due to the meat she threw to it, and they will not suspect her of sinning. Consequently, she will not be deterred from transgressing. The Gemara discusses Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi’s second difficulty: The ger toshav that was mentioned concerning interest, what is it? What was Rabbi Yehuda’s difficulty? As it is written: “And if your brother waxes poor, and his means fail with you, then you shall strengthen him, as a stranger and a resident [ger vetoshav] shall he live with you. You may not take interest or increase from him, but fear your God, and your brother should live with you” (Leviticus 25:35–36). This indicates that interest may not be taken from a ger toshav. And the Gemara raises a contradiction from the mishna: One may borrow money from them, i.e., from gentiles, and lend money to them with interest, and similarly, one may borrow money from and lend money to a ger toshav with interest. Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak says: Is it written: Do not take from them? No, it is written: “Do not take from him,” in the singular, and it means: Do not take interest from a Jew. With regard to this verse the Sages taught: “You may not take interest or increase from him,” but you may become a guarantor for him for a transaction involving interest. The Gemara asks: You may become a guarantor for whom? If we say it means a guarantor for a Jew who lends money to another Jew with interest, that is difficult. But this would be contradicted by that which the Sages taught in a mishna (75b): These are the ones who transgress a prohibition: The lender and the borrower, the guarantor and the witnesses. It is prohibited to serve as a guarantor for such a loan. Rather, it must mean that one may serve as a guarantor for a gentile who lends to another Jew with interest. This is also difficult, since the law of the gentiles is that he goes after the guarantor to collect the money without trying to collect first from the borrower. Under gentile law, it is the responsibility of the guarantor to pay the lender and to then retrieve the money from the borrower. Consequently, when this occurs, the guarantor is considered to have borrowed money from the gentile and lent it himself to the Jew, with the result that the guarantor is the one who takes the interest from the borrower, which is prohibited. Rav Sheshet said: The case is that the gentile accepted upon himself to have this transaction judged by the laws of the Jews, so that he may not claim repayment from the guarantor. The Gemara asks: If the gentile accepted upon himself to have this transaction judged by the laws of the Jews, he should also not take interest, since that is prohibited by Jewish law. In response, Rav Sheshet said: He accepted upon himself the laws of the Jews with regard to this, the procedural matter with regard to the method of collection, but he did not accept upon himself the laws of the Jews with regard to that, the prohibition against taking interest. § The mishna teaches: A Jew may serve as a middleman and lend a gentile’s money to another Jew with the knowledge of the gentile, but not with the knowledge of a Jew, i.e., the middleman himself. The Sages taught in a baraita: A Jew may lend a gentile’s money as a middleman to another Jew with the knowledge of the gentile, but not with the knowledge of a Jew. How so? In the case of a Jew who borrowed money with interest from a gentile and then wanted to return it to him, but at that point another Jew found the borrower and said to him: Since you do not need this money anymore and I do need it, give it to me and I will pay you with the addition of interest in the same way that you pay the gentile, this is prohibited, since this is interest paid to a Jew. But if the borrower presented the second Jew to the gentile and the gentile agreed to this arrangement, it is permitted. The baraita continues: And similarly, if a gentile borrowed money with interest from a Jew and then wanted to return it to him, and another Jew found the gentile and said to him: Give it to me and I will pay you interest in the same way that you pay the Jewish lender, this is permitted, since he pays interest to a gentile and not to a Jew. But if the gentile borrower presented the second Jew to the Jew who lent him the money and the Jewish lender agreed to this arrangement, it is prohibited. The Gemara discusses the baraita: Granted, the latter clause of the baraita, which says that it is prohibited for a Jew to pay the gentile borrower when the Jewish lender is aware of the transaction, can be explained as a stringency due to concern about the prohibition of interest, but in the first clause the Jewish lender presents the Jewish borrower to the gentile before handing him the money, and the fact that this is permitted indicates that he acts as the gentile’s agent, not on his own. But since the halakha is that there is no agency for a gentile, this means that the Jew is the one who takes the interest from the second borrower. Why, then, does the baraita permit it? Rav Huna bar Manoaḥ said in the name of Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ika: Here we are dealing with a case where the gentile said to the Jew when he returned the money: Place it upon the ground and be dismissed, and afterward the other Jew went and took it. Therefore, the loan was transacted directly between the second Jew and the gentile. The Gemara asks: If that is so, what is the purpose of stating it? In this scenario it is obvious that there are two separate loans and the first Jewish lender has nothing to do with the loan to the second. This is certainly permitted. Rather, Rav Pappa said: It must be speaking about a case where the gentile took the money from the first Jew and gave it to the second Jew by hand. The Gemara asks: But still, what is the purpose of stating it? In this case also, the second loan is clearly transacted directly with the gentile lender. The Gemara answers: Lest you say: The gentile himself, when he does this, he gives it with the knowledge of the Jew, as he trusts the second borrower due to the mediation of the first, and therefore one might have thought he is deemed involved in the loan. To counter this, the baraita teaches us that this is not the case. Rav Ashi said: It is possible to explain the baraita in a different way. When we say that the halakha is that there is no agency for a gentile, this matter applies concerning the separation of teruma, the portion of produce designated for a priest. It is in this context that the halakha that there is no agency for a gentile is derived, but concerning the rest of the halakhot of the Torah, there is agency for a gentile. The Gemara comments: And this opinion of Rav Ashi is an error, since what is different about teruma that a gentile cannot be appointed an agent? As it is written concerning teruma: “So you also shall set apart a gift unto the Lord of all your tithes” (Numbers 18:28); once the verse states “you,” the addition of the word “also” in the phrase “you also” serves to include an agent. The Sages additionally derive: Just as you, those who appoint agents, are members of the covenant, i.e., Jews, so too, your agents must be members of the covenant. A gentile cannot separate teruma even if appointed as an agent by a Jew. The Gemara continues: The concept of agency with regard to the rest of the halakhot of the Torah is also a matter we learn through tradition by a derivation from teruma, as this is the source for the halakha that the legal status of one’s agent is like that of himself. Therefore, the same halakhot apply to agency in all matters. Rather, it must be concluded that the opinion expressed by Rav Ashi is an error. There are those who say a different version of this discussion: Rav Ashi said: When we say that there is no agency for a gentile, this matter applies concerning them serving as agents for us, but we can be agents for them. With regard to this comment it was said: And this opinion of Rav Ashi is an error, as what is different that they cannot serve as agents for us? As it is written concerning teruma: “So you also shall set apart a gift unto the Lord of all your tithes” (Numbers 18:28). Once the verse states “you,” the addition of the word “also” in the phrase “you also” serves to include your agents. The Sages also derive: Just as you, those who appoint agents, are members of the covenant, i.e., Jews, so too, your agents must be members of the covenant. The Gemara continues: Therefore, we also cannot serve as agents for them, because the same principle is said: Just as you, those who appoint the agents, are children of the covenant, so too, all who appoint agents must be members of the covenant. Rather, it must be concluded that this opinion expressed by Rav Ashi is an error. Ravina says another answer: Granted, a gentile is not included in the category of agency. But he has the power, by rabbinic law, to acquire an item through an act of acquisition performed by another. This is similar to the halakha concerning a Jewish minor. As with a minor, is it not the case that even though he is not included in the category of agency,