Middot and Analogies

Reish Lakish raised a dilemma before Rabbi Yoḥanan:

If there are witnesses who do not know how to sign their names,

what is the halakha: May their names be written for them with red dye, and afterward they will sign on top of it in ink?

The question is: Is the upper writing, which was not directly on the document but on top of other ink, considered to be writing, or is it not writing?

He said to him: It is not writing. Consequently, this may not be done for witnesses who do not know how to sign.

Reish Lakish said to him: Didn’t our master, i.e., Rabbi Yoḥanan, teach us that the upper writing is considered to be writing with regard to the halakhot of Shabbat?

Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: And because we compare the halakhot pertaining to bills of divorce to the halakhot of Shabbat, shall we perform an action and teach that a bill of divorce may be written in this manner?

It happened that the reservoir of Discus at Jabneh was damaged, measured, and found deficient. Rebbi Ṭarphon declared pure and Rebbi Aqiba impure.

Rebbi Ṭarphon said, the prior status of this miqweh was one of purity; it remains forever in its purity until it becomes known that it is deficient.

Rebbi Aqiba said, the prior status of the impure is impurity, he remains forever in his impurity until it becomes known that he is pure.

Rebbi Ṭarphon said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he was the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, whose work is valid.

Rebbi Aqiba said, to what can this be compared? To one who was standing sacrificing on the altar when it became known that he has a bodily defect, whose work is invalid.

Rebbi Ṭarphon said to him, how is that, Aqiba? I am comparing this to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, and you compare it to one with a bodily defect.

Let us see to which case it really is similar; if to the son of a divorcee or of a woman who had performed ḥaliẓah, let us learn from the son of the divorcee, but if to one with a bodily defect, let us learn from the person with a bodily defect.

Rebbi Aqiba said to him, the miqweh is invalid because of an inherent defect; the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of an inherent defect. The son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified because of others.

The miqweh is invalid because of itself, the one with a bodily defect is disqualified because of himself; the son of a divorcee cannot prove anything since he is disqualified by the court.

They voted on the matter and declared it impure.

Rebbi Ṭarphon said to Rebbi Aqiba, he who separates himself from you is as if he separated himself from his own life.

The Sages taught: One may write phylacteries on the hide of a kosher domesticated animal, and on the hide of a kosher non-domesticated animal, and on the hides of their unslaughtered carcasses [neveilot], and on the hides of animals with a condition that will cause them to die within twelve months [tereifot]...

But one may not write on the hide of a non-kosher animal, or on the hide of a non-kosher undomesticated animal, and it goes without saying that one may not write on their skins when they are neveilot or tereifot.

And this question was asked by a Boethusian to Rabbi Yehoshua HaGarsi:

From where is it derived that one may not write phylacteries on the hide of a non-kosher animal?

He said to him, it is as it is written: “So that God’s Torah will be in your mouth.” The Rabbis derived that one may write the passages only on an item that is permitted to be placed in one’s mouth, i.e., eaten.

He said to him: If that is so, on the skin of neveilot and tereifot coming from kosher animals, one should not write phylacteries, as they may not be eaten.

He said to him: I will tell you a parable. To what is this similar? To two people who were sentenced to death by the king.

One was killed by the king himself, and one was killed by an executioner [ispaklitor].

Which one is more praiseworthy? You must say: The one that the king himself killed.

Therefore, an animal that died at the hands of Heaven and not by a human action is superior.

He said to him: If so, then the neveilot and tereifot should be eaten, as they were killed by the king.

He said to him: The Torah said: “Do not eat any neveila” (Deuteronomy 14:20) and you say they should be eaten? A Torah decree determines that they may not be eaten, but that does not mean they are inferior.

The Boethusian said to him: Well put [kalos].

And Rabbi Yitzḥak said: A person is obligated to purify himself on a Festival,

as it is stated: “And their carcasses you shall not touch; they are impure to you” (Leviticus 11:8). This verse is referring to the Festivals, as taught in the following baraita.

This is also taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And their carcass you shall not touch.”

One might have thought that ordinary Jews are prohibited from touching an animal carcass.

Therefore, the verse states: “Speak to the priests, the sons of Aaron, and say to them: There shall none be defiled for the dead among his people” (Leviticus 21:1).

It is derived from here that the sons of Aaron are prohibited from defiling themselves, but the children of Israel, i.e., non-priests, are not prohibited from doing so.

These matters an a fortiori inference. If, with regard to severe impurity, i.e., contact with a human corpse, priests are prohibited from defiling themselves, while ordinary Israelites are not prohibited from doing so, in the case of light impurity, e.g., touching an animal carcass, is it not all the more so that Israelites be permitted to defile themselves.

Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states: “And their carcass you shall not touch?” It means that on a Festival all are obligated to purify themselves. §

The Sages taught: The verse states: “You shall do no unrighteousness in judgment, in measure, in weight, or in volume [uvamesura]” (Leviticus 19:35).

“In measure”; this is referring to the measurement of land, e.g., this means that in a case where two people are dividing their jointly owned field, one may not measure the land to be given to one during the summer and measure the land to be given to the other during the rainy season, because the length of the measuring cord is affected by the weather conditions.

“In weight”; this is referring to the fact that he may not bury his measuring weights in salt.

And “in volume”; this teaches that one may not froth the liquid one is selling, creating the impression that there is more liquid in the vessel than there actually is.

The Gemara adds: And are the following matters not inferred a fortiori: And if with regard to the mesura volume, which equals one thirty-third of a log, the Torah was fastidious concerning it that one may not deceive another,

it can be inferred a fortiori that with regard to a hin, which equals twelve log, and a half-hin, and a third-hin, and a quarter-hin, and a log, and a half-log, and a quarter-log, which are all much larger volumes, that one may not deceive another. §

If that is so, then according to the Sages, who hold that slaves are in the category of brothers, a Canaanite slave should be fit to bear witness,

as it is written: “And behold, the witness is a false witness, and has testified falsely against his brother” (Deuteronomy 19:18). If a slave is considered a brother, why is he not eligible to testify in court?

Ulla said: You cannot say that a slave is fit to bear witness,

because the halakha concerning the testimony of a slave is derived by an a fortiori inference from the halakha concerning the testimony of a woman:

And just as a woman, who is fit to enter into the congregation, i.e., to marry a Jew of fit lineage, is nevertheless disqualified from bearing witness,

so too, with regard to a slave, who is not fit to enter the congregation, is it not logical that he is disqualified from bearing witness?

The Gemara counters this derivation: What is notable about a woman? She is notable in that she is not fit to undergo the mitzva of circumcision. Would you say that from the fact that a woman is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is fit to undergo circumcision?

The Gemara responds: The halakha of a minor shall prove that one’s fitness to undergo circumcision is not germane to one’s qualification to bear witness, as a minor is included in the mitzva to undergo circumcision, and yet he is disqualified from bearing witness.

This is countered: What is notable about a minor? He is notable in that he is not obligated in the performance of mitzvot. Would you say that from the fact that a minor is disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is obligated in the performance of mitzvot?

The Gemara responds: The halakha of a woman shall prove the matter, as she is obligated in the performance of mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.

And the derivation has reverted to its starting point. The aspect of this case is not like the aspect of that case, and the aspect of that case is not like the aspect of this case, as each case has its own unique halakha.

Their common denominator is that both a woman and a minor are not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and are disqualified from bearing witness.

I will also bring the case of the slave for inclusion in this halakha, as he is also not obligated in the performance of all the mitzvot and is disqualified from bearing witness.

This derivation is rejected: What is notable about their common denominator? It is notable in that a woman or a minor is not a man, and this is why they are disqualified from bearing witness. Would you say that from the fact that they are disqualified from bearing witness one can derive that the same is true for a slave, who is a man?

“And the frog came up and covered the land of Egypt” (Exodus 8:2).

Rabbi Elazar says: At first it was one frog; it spawned and filled the entire land of Egypt.

Rabbi Akiva says: It was one frog, and it spawned and filled the entire land of Egypt with frogs.

Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya said to him: Akiva, what are you doing with aggada? Take your statements to Nega’im and Oholot.

It was one frog; it whistled to the other frogs, and they all came after it.