Part I: "What do they say about us?"
Session II: The Talmud
I.
תלמוד בבלי מסכת סוטה דף כא עמוד א
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AND ANOTHER FOR THREE YEARS etc. |
ויש זכות תולה ג' שנים כו'! |
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What sort of merit? |
זכות דמאי? |
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If I answer merit of [studying] Torah, she is [in the category] of one who is not commanded and fulfils! |
אילימא זכות דתורה, הא אינה מצווה ועושה היא |
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— Rather must it be merit of [performing] a commandment. |
אלא זכות דמצוה, |
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But does the merit of performing a commandment protect as much as that? |
זכות דמצוה מי מגנא כולי האי? |
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— Surely it has been taught: The following did R. Menahem son of R. Jose expound: For the commandment is a lamp and Torah is light — the verse identifies the commandment with a lamp and Torah with light; the commandment with a lamp to tell thee that as a lamp only protects temporarily, so [the fulfilment of] a commandment only protects temporarily; and Torah with light to tell thee that as light protects permanently, so Torah protects permanently; and it states: When thou walkest it shall lead thee etc. … |
והתניא, את זו דרש רבי מנחם בר יוסי: דכי נר מצוה ותורה אור - תלה הכתוב את המצוה בנר ואת התורה באור, את המצוה בנר, לומר לך: מה נר אינה מגינה אלא לפי שעה, אף מצוה אינה מגינה אלא לפי שעה; ואת התורה באור, לומר לך: מה אור מגין לעולם, אף תורה מגינה לעולם; ואומר: הבהתהלכך תנחה אותך וגו' |
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Rabina said: It is certainly merit of [the study of] Torah [which causes the water to suspend its effect]; and when you argue that she is in the category of one who is not commanded and fulfils, [it can be answered] granted that women are not so commanded, still when they cause their sons to read Scripture and repeat Mishnah and wait for their husbands until they return from the Schools, should they not share [the merit] with them? |
רבינא אמר: לעולם זכות תורה, ודקאמרת אינה מצווה ועושה! נהי דפקודי לא מפקדא, באגרא דמקרין ומתניין בנייהו ונטרן להו לגברייהו עד דאתו מבי מדרשא, מי לא פלגאן בהדייהו? |
Questions:
This sugya discusses the following passage in the Mishnah.
אם יש לה זכות היתה תולה לה
If she possessed a merit, it causes the water to suspend its effect upon her.
According to this Mishnah, if the woman who is undergoing the sotah trial has a merit, the effects of the sotah water are suspended. The Gemarah goes on to discuss what kind of merit the Mishnah is referring to: Is it merit for studying Torah? For performing a mitzvah? Eventually the Gemarah concludes that it must be a merit for studying Torah.
According to the following midrash, women are not commanded to study Torah:
דאמר קרא: ולמדתם אותם את בניכם - ולא בנותיכם
Scripture says: “You shall teach them to your sons – and not daughters”
Still, this sugya imagine women not only doing so but also getting a reward from it. Why? Why would the rabbis want to encourage women to be involved in Torah study, if Torah itself has excluded them from this mitzvah?
II.
משנה מסכת סוטה פרק ג: משנה ד
מכאן אומר בן עזאי חייב אדם ללמד את בתו תורה שאם תשתה תדע שהזכות תולה לה
רבי אליעזר אומר כל המלמד בתו תורה כאילו לומדה תפלות
רבי יהושע אומר רוצה אשה בקב ותפלות מתשעה קבין ופרישות
Hence declared Ben Azzai, a man is under the obligation to teach his daughter Torah, so that if she has to drink, she may know that the merit suspends its effect.
Rabbi Eliezer says: Whoever teaches his daughter Torah, teaches her obscenity.
Rabbi Joshua says: A woman prefers one kab and sexual indulgence to nine kabin and continence.
תלמוד בבלי מסכת סוטה דף כא עמוד ב
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תיפלות ס"ד? אלא אימא: כאילו למדה תיפלות. |
Can it enter your mind [that by teaching her Torah he actually teaches her] obscenity! Read, rather: as though he had taught her obscenity. |
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א"ר אבהו: מ"ט דר"א? דכתיב: אאני חכמה שכנתי ערמה, כיון שנכנסה חכמה באדם - נכנסה עמו ערמומית |
R. Abbahu said: What is R. Eliezer's reason? Because it is written: I wisdom have made subtlety my dwelling, i.e., when wisdom enters a man subtlety enters with it. |
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(…). רבי יהושע אומר: רוצה אשה וכו'. מאי קאמר? הכי קאמר: רוצה אשה בקב ותיפלות עמו, מתשעת קבין ופרישות |
R. JOSHUA SAYS: A WOMAN PREFERS etc. What does he intend? — He means that a woman prefers one kab and sensuality with it to nine kab with continence. |
Question:
According to Ben Azzai, why should fathers teach their daughters Torah?
According to Rabbi Eliezer, why shouldn’t fathers teach their daughters Torah? How does the Gemara explain Rabbi Eliezer’s opinion?
According to Rabbi Joshua, why should women not study Torah?
Compare and contrast these opinions with the statements about women and Torah study in the previous sugya. Why would some encourage women to study Torah while others discourage them? What motivations might be behind the different attitudes?
III.
תלמוד בבלי מסכת פסחים דף קח עמוד א,ב
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R. Joshua b. Levi also said: Women are subject to [the law of] these four cups because they too were included in the same miracle … |
ואמר רבי יהושע בן לוי: נשים חייבות בארבעה כוסות הללו שאף הן היו באותו הנס |
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Our Rabbis taught: All are bound to [drink] the four cups, men, women, and children. Said R. Judah: Of what benefit then is wine to children? |
תנו רבנן: הכל חייבין בארבעה כוסות הללו, אחד אנשים ואחד נשים, ואחד תינוקות. אמר רבי יהודה: וכי מה תועלת יש לתינוקות ביין? . . |
Questions:
The Mishnah Kidushin 1:7 introduces the following general rule:
משנה ז
[*] . וכל מצות עשה שהזמן גרמה אנשים חייבין ונשים פטורות
All positive time-bound mitzvot, men are obligated and women are exempted.
According to this general rule, women should be exempted from drinking the four cups of wine during the Seder, as it is a positive (Drink!) time-bound (during the Seder) mitzvah. However, Rabbi Joshua b. Levi determines that women are obligated to perform this mitzvah. Why? What is his rationale? What is the connection between his rationale and the ritual of drinking the four cups?
IV.
תוספות מסכת פסחים דף קח עמוד ב
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They too were included in the same miracle - If it were not for this reason, they would not be obligated, since women are exempted from positive time - bound mitzvot |
שאף הן היו באותו הנס - ואי לאו האי טעמא לא היו חייבות משום דנשים פטורות ממצות עשה שהזמן גרמא |
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even though the four cups is a mitzvah d'rabannan, it was established as a d'oraitah mitzvah. |
אף ע"ג דארבעה כוסות דרבנן כעין דאורייתא תיקון |
Questions:
Tossafot explains why R. Joshua b. Levi needed to give an explanation for obligating women to the four cups: although this is a rabbinic mitzvah (that is not found in the Torah), it has the strength of a Torah mitzvah. Within this Tossafot statement, there are two powerful affirmations about rabbinic autonomy: 1) That they could create exceptions to Torah rules and obligate women to what otherwise they would be exempted from, as long as they explained why; 2) That they could create their own parameters of obligation and exemptions to their own rules with no explanation needed.
Why would they want to claim that autonomy? Why would they want to use it to include women?
V.
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They were included in the same miracle - Rashbam explains (R. Joshua b. Levi's reasoning) that we were saved on their (women's) account, just like in the case of the Meguillah (Purim), which was on account of Esther, and in Chanukah, which was on account of Yehudit. |
היו באותו הנס - פי' רשב"ם שעל ידם נגאלו וכן במגילה ע"י אסתר ובחנוכה ע"י יהודית |
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However, this explanation is problematic, since the expression "Af" (too, also) implies that women were not the protagonist |
וקשה דאף משמע שאינן עיקר |
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Also, the Talmud Yerushalmi explains that "Af" implies that they (women) were part of the same danger, meaning, they were under the same danger of being killed and exterminated. |
ועוד דבירושלמי גריס שאף הן היו באותו ספק משמע באו סכנה דלהשמיד להרוג ולאבד |
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However, when they say that women are exempted from succah, even though they too were included in that miracle, that is because the Torah verse says "I made you dwell in Succot". In that case (Succot), it is a mitzvah d'oraitah |
והא דאמרינן דפטורות מסוכה אע"ג דאף הן היו באותו הנס כי בסוכות הושבתי התם בעשה דאורייתא |
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however the four cups are d'rabannan, so they established it also for women, since they too were included in that miracle. |
אבל בארבעה כוסות דרבנן תיקנו גם לנשים כיון שהיו באותו הנס |
Questions:
Rashbam and Tossafot have different understandings of what R. Joshua ben Levi's reasoning means. What is Rashbam's understanding? What is Tossafot’s understanding? How do they differ in their understanding of women's agency in Jewish history?
Why does this Tossafot discuss the mitzvah of succot? This Tossafot has a more limiting understanding of rabbinic autonomy than the previous one - how does it understand it?
VI.
תלמוד בבלי מסכת עירובין דף צו עמוד א- ב
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For it was taught: Michal the daughter of the Kushite wore tefillin and the Sages did not attempt to prevent her, and the wife of Jonah attended the festival pilgrimage and the Sages did not prevent her. |
דתניא: מיכל בתכושי היתה מנחת תפילין ולא מיחו בה חכמים. ואשתו של יונה היתה עולה לרגל ולא מיחו בה חכמים. |
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Now since the Sages did not prevent her, it is clearly evident that they hold the view that it is a positive precept the performance of which is not limited to a particular time. |
מדלא מיחו בה חכמים – אלמא קסברי: מצות עשה שלא הזמן גרמא היא |
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But is it not possible that he holds the same view as R. Jose who ruled: It is optional for women to lay their hands upon an offering? |
. – ודילמא סבר לה כרבי יוסי, דאמר: נשים סומכות רשות. |
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For were you not to say so, how is it that Jonah’s wife attended the festival pilgrimage and the Sages did not prevent her, seeing that there is no one who contends that the observance of a festival is not a positive precept the performance of which is limited to a particular time? |
דאי לא תימא הכי – אשתו של יונה היתה עולה לרגל ולא מיחו בה. מי איכא למאן דאמר רגל לאו מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא הוא? |
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You must consequently admit that he holds it to be optional; could it not then here also be said to be optional? |
אלא: קסבר רשות, הכא נמי: רשות. (…) |
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But is it not possible that he holds the same view as R. Yossi who stated: It is optional for women to lay their hands upon an offering? |
ודילמא סבר לה כרבי יוסי, דאמר: נשים סומכות רשות? |
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This cannot be entertained at all, neither R. Meir holds the same view as R. Jose nor does R. Judah hold the same view as R. Jose. |
- לא סלקא דעתך, דלא רבי מאיר סבר לה כרבי יוסי, ולא רבי יהודהסבר לה כרבי יוסי. |
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‘Neither R. Meir holds the same view as R. Jose’, since we learned: ‘Children are not to be prevented from blowing the shofar’; from which it follows that women are to be prevented; and any anonymous Mishnah represents the view of R. Meir |
לא רבי מאיר סבר לה כרבי יוסי – דתנן: אין מעכבין את התינוקות מלתקוע. הא נשים – מעכבין. וסתם מתניתין רבי מאיר. |
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Nor does R.Judah hold the same view as R. Jose’, since it was taught: Speak unto the children of Israel … and he shall lay, only the sons of Israel ‘shall lay’ but not the daughters of Israel. R. Jose and R.Simeon ruled: It is optional for women to lay. Now who is the author of all anonymous statement in the Sifra? R. Judah. |
ולא רבי יהודה סבר להכרבי יוסי – דתניא: אדבר אל בני ישראל וסמך – בני ישראל סומכין ואין בנות ישראל סומכות. רבי יוסי ורבי שמעון אומרים: נשים סומכות רשות. וסתם סיפרא מני –רבי יהודה.. |
תוספות בבלי מסכת עירובין דף צו עמוד א
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דילמא סבר לה כר' יוסי דאמר נשים סומכות רשות – מכאן אר"ת דמותר לנשים לברך על כל מצות עשה שהזמן גרמא אע"ג דפטורות כמו מיכל בת שאול שהיתה מסתמא גם מברכת |
But is it not possible that he holds the same view as R. Yossi who ruled: It is optional for women to lay their hands upon an offering?- From this Rabbeinu Tam says that women can bless over positive time-bound mitzvot, even though they are exempted from them , just as Michal Bat Shaul, who would presumably also bless. |
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אע"ג דר"מ ור' יהודה פליגי עליה כדאמר בסמוך קיימא לן כר' יוסי לגבי תרווייהו |
Even though Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehudah disagree about it, as we learn further on, the opinion of Rabbi Yossi stands in opposition to both of them (R. Meir and R. Yehudah) |
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ואע"ג דסתם מתני' דאין מעכבין את התינוקות מלתקוע דלא כר' יוסי דמשמע הא נשים מעכבין כדאמר בסמוך |
And even though the anonymous voice of the Mishnah that says “we should not prevent a child from blowing the shofar” is not like Rabbi Yossi, for it implies that regarding women we do prevent them, as it is explained further on |
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אפ"ה מעשה רב דמיכל בת שאול ואשתו של יונה |
Even so, we have these anecdotes as precedents about Michal bat Shaul and the wife of Yonah. |
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ועובדא דפרק אין דורשין (חגיגה דף טזJדהביאנוהו לעזרת נשים כדי לעשות להם נחת רוח |
And another instance/precedent in Massechet Chagigah in which they would bring the sacrifice to the women’s section, to give them spiritual satisfaction. |
Questions:
The sugya in Massechet Eruvin discusses the cases of two women, Michal bat Kushi and the wife of Yonah, who were allowed to perform mitzvot normally assigned to men. The sugya asks: were they allowed to do so because these mitzvot are not time-bound mitzvoth or, were they allowed to do so because the rabbis followed the opinion of Rabbi Yossi, according to whom, when women are exempted from a mitzvah, they are still allowed to perform it if they want? What is the final conclusion of the sugya?
What is Tossafot’s conclusion?
What are the two reasons the Tossafot offers for its conclusion?
Why would anecdotes serve as precedent for overlooking a general rule? What might spiritual satisfaction mean?