"האב על הבן": פרנסה, חינוך וסמכות הורית

2) (Vayikra 19:3) ("A man, his mother and his father, you shall fear, and My Sabbaths you shall keep; I am the L–rd your G d.") "A man": This tells me only of a man. Whence do I derive the same for a woman? From "you (plural) shall fear." 3) If so, why is "a man" written? A man is in a position of doing (things to honor his parents), unlike a woman, who is subject to her husband's will.

That even with regard to his daughter, there is no obligation to provide her sustenance, however, there is a mitzva to do so. And if you wish, say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda, and this what he said in the mishna: A father is not obligated to provide sustenance for his daughter, and all the more so he is not duty-bound to provide for his son. It may be inferred from here that there is at least a mitzva with regard to a son, and the same applies by a fortiori inference with regard to the daughters. And the reason that the mishna teaches the case of his daughter is because it teaches us this: That even with regard to his daughter there is no obligation, despite the mitzva to guard her from dishonor. And if you wish, say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan ben Beroka, and this is what he said in the mishna: A father is not obligated to provide sustenance for his daughter, and the same is true with regard to providing for his son. And the same is true with regard to a mitzva; there is not even a mitzva to feed either one’s sons or daughters, but since the tanna wanted to say with regard to daughters that after their father’s death there is an obligation to sustain them from his estate, he also taught in a parallel manner that the father is not obligated to provide sustenance for his daughters during his lifetime. Consequently, it is incorrect to infer from here that there is a mitzva to sustain them despite the lack of obligation; rather, the tanna means that there is no obligation and not even a mitzva to do so. § Rabbi Ile’a said that Reish Lakish said in the name of Rabbi Yehuda bar Ḥanina: In Usha the Sages instituted that a man should sustain his sons and daughters when they are minors. A dilemma was raised before the Sages: Is the halakha in accordance with his opinion or is the halakha not in accordance with his opinion? Must a man feed his young children in practice or not? The Gemara answers: Come and hear: When they would come before Rav Yehuda to complain about a father who refused to sustain his children, he would say to them: The jackal [yarod] bears offspring and casts the obligation to feed them on the residents of the town? Even a jackal feeds its young, and it is certainly proper for a father to support his children. When they would come before Rav Ḥisda to register a similar complaint, he would say to them: Turn over a mortar for him in public, as a raised platform, and let that father stand up and say about himself: The raven wants to care for its sons, and yet this man does not want to support his sons. The Gemara questions this statement: And does the raven want to feed its sons? But isn’t it written: “He gives to the beast its food, to the young ravens that cry” (Psalms 147:9)? This verse indicates that the parents of young ravens do not feed them. The Gemara responds: This is not difficult, as in this case it is referring to white ones, and in that case it is referring to black ones. There are different types of ravens, some of which feed their young while others do not. The Gemara further relates: When an incident of this kind would come before Rava, he would say to the father: Is it satisfactory to you that your sons are sustained through charity? All these incidents prove that the halakha is not in accordance with the enactment of Usha; although these Sages stated forcefully that it is proper for a father to support his children, they did not force him to do so by the authority of the court. The Gemara adds: And we said this halakha only when he is not wealthy and must toil hard to provide food for his children, but if he is wealthy we coerce him against his will to sustain them. Like this case of Rava, who coerced Rav Natan bar Ami, who was a wealthy man, to donate to charity, and collected from him four hundred dinars for charity. This shows that even in the absence of a particular obligation, the court will compel a person to give charity if he can afford it. The same reasoning certainly applies to a man’s own children. § Rabbi Ile’a said that Reish Lakish said: In Usha the Sages instituted that in a case of one who writes a document stating that he is giving all his property as a gift to his sons in his lifetime, he and his wife are sustained from the property until their deaths. Rabbi Zeira objects to this, and some say this objection was raised by Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani: What is the significance of this ruling? After all, the Sages said a greater novelty than that: A man’s widow is sustained from his property even if his estate was inherited by his daughter and therefore belongs to her husband. Although the property is comparable to property from the estate that was sold to a third party, from which a widow is not entitled to claim her sustenance, in this case the Sages decreed that she can claim her livelihood from her late husband’s estate to prevent her from losing out entirely. With this in mind, is it necessary to state that he and his wife, during his lifetime, receive their sustenance from property he gave as a gift to his sons? The Gemara provides the background for this ruling: As Ravin sent in his letter to Babylonia: With regard to one who died and left a widow and a daughter, his widow is sustained from his property, as this is a stipulation of the marriage contract. If the daughter, who is her father’s heir, married, the estate is considered usufruct property whose produce belongs to her husband, but even so his widow is sustained from his property. If the daughter died and her husband inherited from her, Rabbi Yehuda, son of the sister of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina, said: I was involved in an incident of this kind when this very question came before the Sages for a ruling, and they said: Even in this case, his widow is sustained from his property. The Gemara reiterates: With all that said, is it necessary to state that he and his wife are entitled to receive their sustenance from property he gave his son? The Gemara responds: The ordinance is necessary lest you say that it is in that case there, with regard to a widow, that they instituted this halakha, as there is no one to toil on her behalf, since she is by herself, but here, where the husband is alive, he can toil for himself and for her, i.e., his wife. The ordinance of Usha therefore teaches us that the court does not force him to do so, and they may claim their sustenance from his former property. A dilemma was raised before the scholars: Is the halakha in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ile’a, or is the halakha not in accordance with his opinion? The Gemara answers: Come and hear, as Rabbi Ḥanina and Rabbi Yonatan were standing together, and a certain man approached, bent over, and kissed Rabbi Yonatan on his foot. Rabbi Ḥanina said to Rabbi Yonatan: What is this? Why does he owe you such a mark of gratitude? He said to him: He wrote a document stating that he was giving his property to his sons,

and I forced them to feed him, for which he is grateful. The Gemara interprets this incident in light of the issue at hand: Granted, if you say that this was not according to the halakha, i.e., the man’s sons had the right to refrain from sustaining him, due to that reason Rabbi Yonatan had to force them to feed their father; but if you say this is the halakha, i.e., the man’s sons were required to sustain him, why did he need to force them to provide the sustenance of their own accord? The court could have simply requisitioned the necessary amount from the property. This shows that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Ile’a. § Apropos the ordinances instituted by the Sages in Usha, the Gemara cites another one. Rabbi Ile’a said: In Usha the Sages instituted that one who dispenses his money to charity should not dispense more than one-fifth. That opinion is also taught in a baraita: One who scatters should not scatter more than one-fifth, lest he render himself destitute and need the help of other people. And an incident occurred involving a certain individual who sought to dispense more than one-fifth of his property as charity, and his friend did not let him act upon his wishes. And who was this friend? Rabbi Yeshevav. And some say that Rabbi Yeshevav was the one who wanted to give too much charity, and his friend did not let him do so, and who was the friend? Rabbi Akiva. Rav Naḥman said, and some say it was Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov who said: What is the verse that alludes to this maximum amount of charity? “And of all that You shall give me, I will surely give a tenth of it [aser a’asrenu] to You” (Genesis 28:22). The double use of the verb that means to donate one-tenth indicates that Jacob, who issued this statement, was actually referring to two-tenths, i.e., one-fifth. The Gemara asks: But the latter tenth is not similar to the first tenth, as it would be one-tenth of what remained after the first tenth had been removed. Consequently, the two-tenths would not equal one-fifth of the original total. The Gemara answers that Rav Ashi said: Since the verse could have said: I will surely give one-tenth [aser a’aser], and instead stated: “I will surely give a tenth of it [aser a’asrenu],” it thereby alludes to the fact that the latter tenth is like the first one. With regard to the above statements concerning the Sages’ ordinances in Usha, Rav Shimi bar Ashi said: And these halakhot continually decrease. The first statement was stated by Rabbi Ile’a, quoting a statement by Reish Lakish in the name of Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina. The second halakha was delivered by Rabbi Ile’a in the name of Reish Lakish, while the third was taught by Rabbi Ile’a without quoting another Sage. And this is your mnemonic for the order of these halakhot: Minors wrote and dispensed. This alludes to the ruling requiring a father to support his children while they are minors, the ruling about one who wrote a document granting all of his property to his sons, and the ruling about one who dispenses large sums to charity. § Rav Yitzḥak said: In Usha the Sages enacted that a person should treat his son gently, even if he does not want to study, until his son is twelve years old. From this point forward he harasses him in all aspects of his life in order to force him to study. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rav say to Rav Shmuel bar Sheilat, who taught children: With regard to a child less than six years old, do not accept him; if he is six years old, accept him and stuff him like an ox, i.e., just as an ox is force-fed, you should force the students to study Torah. The Gemara answers: There is no contradiction here, as yes, one must stuff him like an ox and teach him intensively; however, if the student refuses to learn, one does not harass him in all aspects of his life until after he is twelve years old. And if you wish, say that this is not difficult for a different reason: This halakha, which prescribes forcing the students to study from the age of six, is referring to the Bible, whereas that halakha, that one should not harass a boy to study until he is twelve, is referring to the Mishna. This is as Abaye said: My foster mother told me that a six-year-old is ready for Bible study and a ten-year-old is mature enough to study Mishna. Additionally, a thirteen-year-old is sufficiently developed to fast for twenty-four hours like any other adult. And as for a girl, she must start observing fasts when she is twelve years old. The Gemara cites another statement of Abaye in the name of his foster mother. Abaye said: My mother told me that a six-year-old child who is stung by a scorpion on the day that he completes six years will not live without emergency treatment. What is his cure? The bile of a white vulture in beer. One should rub him with this mixture and make him drink it. She further said to him: A one-year-old child who is stung by a hornet on the day that he completes a year will not live without emergency treatment. What is his cure? Palm-tree fiber in water. Again, one should rub him with it and make him drink it. Rav Ketina said: Anyone who brings his son to school when he is younger than six years old will run after him and not catch him. In other words, he will worry about his welfare for a long time afterward, as the child will be weakened by his studies. There are those who say that his friends will run after him in their studies and not catch him, i.e., his early start will enable him to be far more successful. The Gemara comments: And both are correct; he will weaken physically and learn well. If you wish, say that these two statements can be reconciled differently: This case is dealing with a weak child, who should not be brought to school at such a young age, whereas that statement is referring to a healthy boy, who can go to school at a tender age and succeed in his studies. § Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina said: In Usha the Sages instituted that in the case of a woman who sold her usufruct property, which is property that belongs to her but whose produce belongs to her husband, in her husband’s lifetime, and then she died, the husband can repossess it from the purchasers. The Gemara relates: Rav Yitzḥak bar Yosef found Rabbi Abbahu standing among the congregation [ukhlusa] of Usha. He said to him: Who is the Master who disseminated the halakha that was instituted in Usha? He said to him: Rabbi Yosei bar Ḥanina. He learned it from Rabbi Abbahu forty times, and from that point onward he remembered it so well that it seemed to him as though it were placed in his pocket. The Gemara discusses a point related to one of the ordinances of Usha. The verse states: “Happy are they who keep justice, who perform charity at all times” (Psalms 106:3). But is it possible to perform charity at all times? Is one always in the presence of paupers? Therefore, our Rabbis in Yavne taught, and some say it was Rabbi Eliezer: This is referring to one who sustains his sons and daughters when they are minors. As stated above, he is not formally obligated to support them, and therefore when he does so, it is a form of charity that he gives on a constant basis. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said: This is referring to one who raises an orphan boy or an orphan girl in his house, takes care of them, and marries them off. The Sages likewise expounded the verse: “Wealth and riches are in his house, and his charity endures forever” (Psalms 112:3). How can one’s wealth and riches remain in his house while his charity endures forever? Rav Huna and Rav Ḥisda disputed this issue. One said: This is referring to one who studies Torah and teaches it. He loses nothing of his own, while his charity toward others will endure. And one said: This is one who writes scrolls of the Torah, the Prophets, and the Writings, and lends them to others. The books remain in his possession, but others gain from his charity. With regard to the verse: “And see your son’s sons; peace be upon Israel” (Psalms 128:6), Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said: Once your children have children of their own, there is peace upon Israel, as they will not come to require the ritual through which the yavam frees the yevama of her levirate bonds [ḥalitza] or levirate marriage, which are necessary only if a man dies childless. Rabbi Shmuel bar Naḥmani said: Once your sons have sons there will be peace upon the judges of Israel, as relatives will not come to quarrel with the judges over the inheritance. § The Gemara returns to the mishna: This exposition was expounded by Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya before the Sages in the vineyard of Yavne: Just as the sons inherit only after the father’s death, so too, the daughters are sustained from his property only after their father’s death.

In the latter clause we arrive at the case of schoolchildren who come to learn Torah in his house, and this ruling applies from the time of the ordinance of Yehoshua ben Gamla and onward. What was this ordinance? As Rav Yehuda says that Rav says: Truly, that man is remembered for the good, and his name is Yehoshua ben Gamla. If not for him the Torah would have been forgotten from the Jewish people. Initially, whoever had a father would have his father teach him Torah, and whoever did not have a father would not learn Torah at all. The Gemara explains: What verse did they interpret homiletically that allowed them to conduct themselves in this manner? They interpreted the verse that states: “And you shall teach them [otam] to your sons” (Deuteronomy 11:19), to mean: And you yourselves [atem] shall teach, i.e., you fathers shall teach your sons. When the Sages saw that not everyone was capable of teaching their children and Torah study was declining, they instituted an ordinance that teachers of children should be established in Jerusalem. The Gemara explains: What verse did they interpret homiletically that enabled them to do this? They interpreted the verse: “For Torah emerges from Zion” (Isaiah 2:3). But still, whoever had a father, his father ascended with him to Jerusalem and had him taught, but whoever did not have a father, he did not ascend and learn. Therefore, the Sages instituted an ordinance that teachers of children should be established in one city in each and every region [pelekh]. And they brought the students in at the age of sixteen and at the age of seventeen. But as the students were old and had not yet had any formal education, a student whose teacher grew angry at him would rebel against him and leave. It was impossible to hold the youths there against their will. This state of affairs continued until Yehoshua ben Gamla came and instituted an ordinance that teachers of children should be established in each and every province and in each and every town, and they would bring the children in to learn at the age of six and at the age of seven. With regard to the matter at hand, since this system was established for the masses, the neighbors cannot prevent a scholar from teaching Torah in the courtyard.

in the first clause, the baraita is dealing with a minor who has reached the age of training in mitzvot. This child is taught to sound the shofar, as one is obligated to teach him the proper way to perform mitzvot. However, here, in the second clause, the baraita is dealing with a minor who has not yet reached the age of training. Although one need not prevent this child from sounding the shofar, one does not encourage him to do so.

(Bamidbar 12:10) "And the cloud departed from above the tent": An analogy: A king says to a pedagogue: "Chastise my son — but not until I leave!" For a father is mercifully inclined to his son. Now does this not follow a fortiori, viz.: If the L-rd is mercifully inclined to the righteous in the time of His wrath, how much more so in the time of His (good) will! As it is written (Isaiah 49:8) "In a time of (good) will I (most certainly) will answer you!" (Ibid.) "And, behold, (after the cloud had departed), Miriam was as leprous as snow": We are hereby taught that she was stricken with intense (i.e., highly visible) leprosy, and that she was fair-skinned (for which reason it looked like snow). And thus is it written (Shemot 4:6) "And the L-rd said further to him (Moses): Place now your hand into your bosom … and, behold, his hand was leprous as snow." (Ibid.) "And Aaron 'turned'": He was "turned" from his leprosy. R. Yehudah b. Betheira says: He who says that Aaron was stricken (with leprosy) is destined to pay for it. He who spoke and brought the world into being covered up for him (by not mentioning it explicitly in the verse) and you would reveal it! He who says that Tzelafchad was the mekoshesh ("the wood gatherer" [viz. Bamidbar 15:32]) is destined to pay for it. He who spoke and brought the world into being covered up for him and you would reveal it! And he who says that the ban was placed on Akavya b. Mehalalel (viz. Berachoth 19a) is destined to pay for it. "And Aaron turned to Miriam, and, behold, she was leprous": Scripture hereby apprises us that whenever he looked at her she became leprous. (Ibid. 11) "And Aaron said to Moses: Pray, my lord, do not impute transgression to us in that we have been foolish and have sinned.": He said to him: If we have been willful (in our sin), forgive us, as if we were unwitting. (Ibid. 12) "Let her not be as a dead one": Just as a dead body imparts tumah in a tent, so, a leper imparts tumah by entrance (into a house). Aaron hereby said: Our sister loses on all accounts: I (being her kin) cannot quarantine her nor declare her tamei nor declare her clean. In passing we learn that Aaron expounds that one (a Cohein) does not inspect the plague-spots of his kin. "who leaving his mother's womb": He should have said "who leaving our mother's womb," but Scripture here is being euphemistic. "and half his flesh has been consumed": He should have said "and half our flesh," as in (Bereshit 37:27) "for he is our brother, our flesh," but Scripture here is being euphemistic. (Ibid. 13) "And Moses cried out to the L-rd, saying: 'Lord, I pray You; heal her, I pray You.'": Scripture hereby teaches us proper conduct — that one's requests should be prefaced by two or three words, of imploration. And what is the intent of "saying"? Moses said: Answer me whether You will heal her or not — and the Holy One Blessed be He answered him, viz. (14) "And the L-rd said to Moses: Now if her father had spat in her face, etc." R. Elazar b. Azaryah says: In four places Moses requested (to be answered by the Holy One Blessed be He), and he was answered. Similarly, (Shemot 6:12) "And Moses spoke before the L-rd, to say: "The children of Israel would not listen to me, etc." What is the intent of "to say"? Moses asked the L-rd to answer him whether or not he would redeem them. And He did answer him (Ibid. 7:4) "And I will take out My hosts. My people, Israel, from the land of Egypt." Similarly, (Bamidbar 27:15) "And Moses spoke to the L-rd to say: (16) Let the L-rd, the G-d of the spirits of all flesh, appoint a man over the congregation." What is the intent of "to say"? Moses said to Him: Answer me as to whether or not You will appoint leaders (for them). And He did answer him, (Ibid. 18) "Take for yourself Joshua the son of Nun." Similarly, (Devarim 3:23) "And I implored the L-rd at that time to say." What is the intent of "to say"? He said to Him: Answer me as to whether or not I will enter the land. And He did answer him, (Ibid. 26) "It is enough for you, etc." Here, too, let "to say" not be written. But, (the intent is that) he asked Him to answer whether or not He would heal her, and He answered "Now if her father had spat in her face, etc." (Bamidbar, Ibid. 13) "G-d, I pray You; heal her, I pray You": Why did Moses not prolong his prayer? So that Israel not say "His sister is in distress and he stretches out his prayer." Variantly: It is not that Moses prays and the L-rd hears his prayer, but (in the order of) (Iyyov 22:28) "You (the tzaddik) will decree, and it will be fulfilled for you," (Isaiah 58:9) "Then, when you (the tzaddik) call, the L-rd will answer." R. Eliezer was asked by his disciples: How long shall a man be in his prayer? He answered: Not longer than Moses, of whom it is written (Devarim 9:18) "And I fell down before the L-rd (in prayer) as at first, forty days and forty nights." And how short should he be in prayer? He answered: Not shorter than Moses, of whom it is written "G-d, I pray You; heal her, I pray You." There is a time to be short and a time to be long.