וַיְכַ֖ל לְדַבֵּ֣ר אִתּ֑וֹ וַיַּ֣עַל אֱלֹהִ֔ים מֵעַ֖ל אַבְרָהָֽם׃

Done speaking with him, God* was gone from Abraham.

*This label may refer to an agent, as having spoken on God’s behalf (cf. first note at v. 1); so Ibn Ezra.

(The above rendering—and footnote—come from the RJPS translation, an adaptation of the NJPS translation.)


Here the participant reference (the label אֱלֹהִים “God”) is probably not meant to be taken literally.

Rather, the narrator seems to be employing a linguistic device that I call agency metonymy. Such a device is often used in situations where an agent is acting or speaking on behalf of another party, who is known as the principal. The distinguishing feature of an agency metonym (here, the label “God”) is that it mentions only the principal, who is understood to stand for their agent; and this works because everyone knows that in actual practice, an agent is understood to stand for their principal.

Agency metonymy thus points to both of those parties at the same time—with the agent visible in the foreground, and the principal invisible yet palpable in the background. Thus it is an extremely concise way of speaking, because it leverages the agency relationship.

In other words, when our verse says that it was God who had been speaking with Abraham and then departed, what it means is: “The agent (an angel) who had been speaking on God’s behalf then departed.”

The parties in those roles retain conceptually distinct identities, even when the metonym momen­tarily superimposes them for purposes of narrative art and communicative efficiency. Because this way of speaking is so pointed and concise, it is employed to highlight the principal’s authority behind their agent’s speech or action.

Referring to an agent in terms of the principal (= agency metonymy) was a convention of speech in ancient Hebrew. We know it was conventional because it is attested quite frequently in cases where someone is the agent whose principal is a human individual or group.

In agency contexts, the principal’s name in effect refers to “the named party—and any agents thereof.” (The same goes for a pronoun or verbal inflection that likewise refers to the principal: it includes agents in its scope.) Examples include: Gen 21:30; 42:24; Exod 14:6; Num 21:21; Judg 11:17, 19; 16:19; 20:12; 1 Sam 23:5; 26:11–12; 2 Sam 11:5; 1 Kgs 6:14; 2 Kgs 23:16; Zech 7:2; Ruth 4:17; 2 Chr 7:5.

In ancient Israel, that functional identity was deeply entrenched in everyone’s mind, given that agency relationships served as the basis for daily social, economic, political, and religious transactions. (Sending someone on an errand or to deliver a message were everyday examples.)

Speakers of ancient Hebrew likewise used agency metonyms when describing how they perceived the Deity in operation (e.g., Lot in Gen 19:12–14, and the narrators who depict the recourse to an oracle in Gen 25:22–23; Judg 1:1–2; 20:18, 23, 27–28; 1 Sam 23:9–12; 2 Sam 21:1).

As a matter of convention, the practice is indisputable. There remains, however, some question as to its application in cases where an agent is not explicitly mentioned. Here, in the present verse, the narrator’s mention of departure is what seems to point toward the presence of an agent. It evokes part of the protocol for (human) messengers in the ancient Near East: after having delivered their message, they would return promptly to their principal to make a report.

For another introduction to agency metonymy, see the section “Agency Metonymy: Whose Body Is in View?” in my Notes on Gender in Translation (pp. 24–25). For more on this topic, see my forthcoming article and its attendant documentation.


In footnotes to the RJPS translation, I have made a practice of pointing out those agency metonyms that involve the Deity and yet are not conventional in English, lest these cases be taken literally—and thereby misconstrued as theophanies and/or as depictions of the embodiment of God. (Such readings are unfortunately quite common in academia.)