86 - Muktzah Part 01

What did David do? Every Shabbat he would sit and learn all day long to protect himself from the Angel of Death. On that day on which the Angel of Death was supposed to put his soul to rest, the day on which David was supposed to die, the Angel of Death stood before him and was unable to overcome him because his mouth did not pause from study. The Angel of Death said: What shall I do to him? David had a garden [bustana] behind his house; the Angel of Death came, climbed, and shook the trees. David went out to see. As he climbed the stair, the stair broke beneath him. He was startled and was silent, interrupted his studies for a moment, and died. Since David died in the garden, Solomon sent the following question to the study hall: Father died and is lying in the sun, and the dogs of father’s house are hungry. There is room for concern lest the dogs come and harm his body. What shall I do? They sent an answer to him: Cut up an animal carcass and place it before the dogs. Since the dogs are hungry, handling the animal carcass to feed them is permitted. And with regard to your father, it is prohibited to move his body directly. Place a loaf of bread or an infant on top of him, and you can move him into the shade due to the bread or the infant. And is it not appropriate what Solomon said: “For a living dog is better than a dead lion.” The ultimate conclusion of this discussion is that life is preferable to death. And now, with regard to the question that I asked before you; Rav Tanḥum spoke modestly, as, actually, they had asked him the question. A lamp is called ner and a person’s soul is also called ner, as it is written: “The spirit of man is the lamp [ner] of the Lord” (Proverbs 20:27). It is preferable that the lamp of a being of flesh and blood, an actual lamp, will be extinguished in favor of the lamp of the Holy One, Blessed be He, a person’s soul. Therefore, one is permitted to extinguish a flame for the sake of a sick person.

The Sages taught in the Tosefta: Initially, they would say that only three utensils may be moved on Shabbat: A knife for cutting a cake of dried figs, and a combined spoon and fork (ge’onim) to clean the filth [zuhama listeran] of a pot, and a small knife that is on the table. Each of these items is required for eating and may be used, and it had been prohibited to move any other utensil. However, over the generations, when the Rabbis saw that Jewish people were vigilant in observing the prohibitions of Shabbat, they permitted, and then they permitted again, and then they permitted again, until they said in the last mishna: All utensils may be moved on Shabbat except for a large saw and the blade of a plow.

We learned in the mishna: One is permitted to take an ordinary hand needle used for sewing clothes to extract a thorn with it. Rava, son of Rabba, sent the following question to Rav Yosef: Let our teacher teach us: With regard to a needle whose eye or point was removed, what is its legal status, i.e., is moving it on Shabbat permitted? Rav Yosef said to him: You already learned the answer to that question in the mishna: One is permitted to take an ordinary hand needle used for sewing clothes to extract a thorn with it. And what does the thorn that is stuck in his flesh care whether the needle has an eye or whether it does not have an eye? Since the needle is suited for that purpose, it is permitted to move it. Rava, son of Rabba, raised an objection to Rav Yosef from that which we learned in a mishna: A ritually impure needle whose eye or point was removed becomes ritually pure, because its status as a vessel is negated. Since it is no longer considered a vessel, why would it be permitted to move it? Abaye said: Are you raising a contradiction from the halakhot of ritual impurity to the halakhot of Shabbat? With regard to ritual impurity, we require a functional utensil for it to become ritually impure or to retain impurity, and anything which is not functional is ritually pure. However, with regard to Shabbat we require something that is fit for use, and this too is fit to extract a thorn with it, and therefore, its legal status is that of a utensil and moving it is permitted. Rava said: The one who raises the objection, raises the objection well. From the fact that with regard to ritual impurity it is not considered a utensil, with regard to Shabbat, it is also not considered a utensil, and if it is not a utensil it may not be moved on Shabbat. The Gemara raises an objection to the opinion of Rava based on what was taught in a baraita: A needle, whether it is perforated or whether it is not perforated, it is permitted to move it on Shabbat. And they said that the status of a perforated needle is different only with regard to ritual impurity alone. Abaye interpreted it according to the opinion of Rava: In this mishna, we are dealing with unfinished needles. Sometimes one decides to render them a utensil for other purposes without perforating them. However, in a case where its eye or its point was removed from the finished needle, its status as a vessel was negated, since a person throws it among the junk [gerutaot].

Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said to that tanna: Who could have said this baraita to you? It is evidently in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say that we do not say: Since carrying out was permitted on a Festival for the purpose of food preparation, it was also permitted not for that purpose. For if you say the baraita is accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, they say: Since carrying out was permitted for the requirements of food preparation, it was also permitted not for these requirements. Here, too, with regard to the prohibited labor of slaughtering, since slaughter was permitted for the requirements of food preparation, it was also permitted not for these requirements. It was permitted for any purpose that benefits people, whether directly or indirectly.

Rav Yitzḥak bar Avdimi said to that tanna: Who could have said this baraita to you? It is evidently in accordance with the opinion of Beit Shammai, who say that we do not say: Since carrying out was permitted on a Festival for the purpose of food preparation, it was also permitted not for that purpose. For if you say the baraita is accordance with the opinion of Beit Hillel, they say: Since carrying out was permitted for the requirements of food preparation, it was also permitted not for these requirements. Here, too, with regard to the prohibited labor of slaughtering, since slaughter was permitted for the requirements of food preparation, it was also permitted not for these requirements. It was permitted for any purpose that benefits people, whether directly or indirectly. Rabba strongly objects to this reasoning: From where do you infer that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel disagree over this issue? Perhaps they disagree about the following: The halakhot of eiruv and the prohibition against carrying out apply to Shabbat, but there are no halakhot of eiruv nor a prohibition against carrying out on a Festival. The Gemara clarifies the dispute according to this explanation: One Sage, Beit Shammai, holds that the halakhot of eiruv and the prohibition against carrying out apply to Shabbat, and similarly the halakhot of eiruv and carrying out apply to a Festival. The only difference is that, on a Festival, carrying, like other types of prohibited labor, is permitted for the sake of food preparation. And one Sage, Beit Hillel, holds that the halakhot of eiruv and the prohibition against carrying out apply to Shabbat, but there are no halakhot of eiruv nor a prohibition against carrying out on a Festival, as it is written: “Neither carry forth a burden out of your houses on the Shabbat day” (Jeremiah 17:22), from which Beit Hillel inferred: On Shabbat, yes, carrying from one domain to another is indeed prohibited; on a Festival, no, it is not prohibited. According to this explanation, Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel did not disagree about whether a prohibited labor that is permitted for the purpose of food preparation on a Festival is also permitted when it does not serve that purpose. Rav Yosef strongly objects to this explanation of Rabba: However, if that is so, that the dispute is whether the prohibition against carrying out applies on a Festival, Beit Hillel should permit one to move muktze objects, as the prohibition of handling muktze is an extension of the prohibition against carrying out. Consequently, let them differ with regard to whether or not it is permitted to carry out stones on a Festival. Rather, from the fact that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel do not disagree with regard to stones but concerning objects that serve some sort of purpose, conclude from this: Everyone agrees that carrying out is prohibited on a Festival, and the Torah permitted it only when it is necessary for sustenance.

[Regarding the Sabbath,] the Torah [Exodus 23:12] states: "[On the seventh day,] you shall cease activity." [This implies] ceasing [even the performance of certain] activities that are not [included in the categories of the forbidden] labors.
[The Torah left the definition of the scope of this commandment to] the Sages, [who] forbade many activities as sh'vut. Some activities are forbidden because they resemble the forbidden labors, while other activities are forbidden lest they lead one to commit a forbidden labor. These [activities] include the following:

IT SHALL BE UNTO YOU ‘SHABBATHON’ (A SOLEMN REST). This means that it is to be a day of rest, to repose thereon [from work]. And our Rabbis have said: “The word shabbathon (a solemn rest) amounts to a positive commandment.” Thus one who does work on a festival day transgresses both a negative commandment and a positive commandment, and one who rests thereon fulfills a positive commandment. And in their opinion [that of the Rabbis], all the festivals have been likened one to another, for the word shabbathon is not mentioned in connection with the Festival of Unleavened Bread, nor in connection with the Festival of Weeks.
Now in the Mechilta on the section of Hachodesh I have seen the following text: “And ye shall observe this day. Why is this said? Has it not already been stated, no manner of work shall be done in them? From this I would know only about matters which are considered m’lachah [‘work’ on the Sabbath, and thus forbidden by the Torah]. How do I know about activities which are termed sh’vuth [as explained later on]? From the verse which states, and ye shall observe this day, which includes those activities which are termed sh’vuth. I might then think that on the intermediate days of the festival those activities known as sh’vuth are likewise forbidden, and the following reasoning would favor it etc; Scripture therefore states [with reference to the Festival of Tabernacles], On the first day shall be a solemn rest” [but not on the following intermediate days of the festival].
Thus the Sages interpreted the word shabbathon as indicating a complete rest on that day, desisting even from those activities which are not of the chief labors or their derivatives. But this interpretation is not clear to me. For if you say that this Mechilta is a mere Scriptural support for a Rabbinic ordinance, what reason is there for the Rabbis to use this language [i.e., “How do I know about activities which are termed sh’vuth?” when instead they should have said, “How do I know about activities which are not regarded as m’lachah?”], for the term sh’vuth in the language of the Sages is always used with reference to activities forbidden by the Rabbis; and so how is it possible to say, “How do I know that activities which are forbidden on account of sh’vuth instituted by the Rabbis, are forbidden on the basis of a verse [in Scripture]!” The way in which such [Beraithoth make use of] Scriptural texts as a support for Rabbinical enactments, is by teaching [an interpretation in a verse] showing that they [such Rabbinical enactments] are based on the Torah, but they never say, “That activity which is forbidden by the Sages, from what verse in the Torah do we derive it?” Instead, this [Beraitha of the Mechilta] should have stated, “Activities which are not in the category of m’lachah (‘work’), whence do we know that they are forbidden? From the word shabbathon!”
It appears to me that this interpretation intends to state that we are commanded by law of the Torah to have rest on a festival day even from activities which are not in the category of m’lachah (“work”).
Thus we are not to be engaged the whole day in wearisome tasks: measuring out crops of the field, weighing fruits and gifts, filling the barrels with wine and clearing away the vessels, and moving stones from house to house and from place to place [although none of these activities is “work” in the strict sense of the term]. Similarly, if it be a city encompassed by a wall and its gates are locked at night, [and it is therefore according to law of the Torah treated as one domain, and the prohibition against taking out aught from one domain to another is inapplicable there], they would be loading heaps on asses, as also wine, grapes, and figs and all manner of burdens they would bring on a festival; and the market place would be full for all business transactions, the shops standing open and the shopkeepers giving credit, the money-changers sitting before their tables with the golden coins before them, and the workers would rise early to go to their work and hire themselves out for such works [as described above] just as on weekdays, and so on! And since all these matters do not entail m’lachah, they would be permissible on a festival day and even on the Sabbath itself! Therefore the Torah said that [the festival should be a day of] shabbathon (solemn rest), meaning that it should be a day of rest and ease, not a day of labor [and weariness]. This is a good and beautiful interpretation.
Afterwards I saw the other Mechilta of Rabbi Shimon ben Yochai where it is taught in another form: “I know only that it is forbidden [on a festival day to do] the kind of work for which, [if transgressed on the Sabbath through error], one must bring a sin-offering. How do I know that [it is forbidden to do] such works [on a festival day] for which one does not have to bring a sin-offering [if transgressed through error on the Sabbath], such as climbing a tree or riding on animals or swimming in the water, or slapping one’s thighs or clapping one’s hands? From the verse, no manner of work shall be done in them. I know only concerning acts of [one’s own] choice. How do I know concerning acts commanded [in the Torah], that we may not dedicate anything [to the Temple treasury], or make a vow of valuation, or devote anything [for Temple repairs, or for the priests], or set apart the heave-offering or the tithes? From the expression shabbathon, which means sh’vuth” (rest, abstention from ordinary occupation). In a similar way this [Beraitha] is taught in the Torath Kohanim with reference to the Day of Atonement. Now although these Beraithoth differ in their language and in their interpretations, perhaps they all intend one common thing, namely, to find some Scriptural support for activities forbidden by the Rabbis. But nonetheless, whether the interpretation of the first Beraitha [mentioned above] be as we have said [i.e., that it is forbidden by Scriptural law to do on a festival day activities which are not strictly speaking “work,” but are wearisome labors], or whether all [these Beraithoth] intend only to find a Scriptural support for matters forbidden by the Rabbis, the meaning of the term shabbathon is as we have explained, namely, that we should have a day of repose from labor and toil. This is indeed a very proper and excellent interpretation.
Thus we have been prohibited from doing [any of the main classes of] “work” on the Sabbath by a negative commandment, and [for the intentional transgression thereof is prescribed] the punishment of excision [if the court has no knowledge of the transgression or there are no witnesses, but if there are witnesses who testify, the punishment] is death — but as for labors and toils [which are not strictly speaking “work”], we are commanded by means of this positive commandment; and on a festival day we are prohibited from doing “work” by a negative commandment, [the punishment for the intentional transgression thereof being whipping], and the doing of labors [which are not strictly speaking “work”] we are forbidden by means of a positive commandment. It is on this basis that the prophet [Isaiah] said, If thou turn away thy foot because of the Sabbath, from pursuing thy business on My holy day … not doing thy wonted ways, nor pursuing thy business, nor speaking thereof; [then shalt thou delight thyself in the Eternal]. Similarly, a Sabbath of ‘shabbathon’ (solemn rest) shall be for the Land means that [the seventh year] shall be a Sabbath of rest, that one is not to plow nor cultivate the Land at all. It is because of this that the Sages have interpreted [in the first Beraitha mentioned above] that on the intermediate days of the festival those activities known as sh’vuth are not forbidden. But this is only according to the law of the Torah, for by Rabbinic enactment whatever one may not do oneself one is not permitted to say to a non-Jew to do, since even with reference to the Rabbinic prohibition against telling [a non-Jew to do work], the Sages were strict [in not permitting it on an intermediate day of the festival].

(4) 2. If there is business is happening in his shop at all, he is a mechalel Shabbos v'Yom Tov, since, behold, he is like all people who are mechalel Shabbos by prohibitions that are written in the passuk, as the Ramban, (Parshas Emor, in the passuk of "Shabbason zichron truah," ibid.) who should be remembered for blessing, writes: It appears to me that this interpretation intends to state that we are commanded by law of the Torah to have rest on a Yom Tov day even from activities which are not in the category of m’lachah (“work”). Thus we are not to be engaged the whole day in wearisome tasks: measuring out crops of the field, weighing fruits and gifts, filling the barrels with wine and clearing away the vessels, and moving stones from house to house and from place to place [although none of these activities is “work” in the strict sense of the term]. Similarly, if it be a city encompassed by a wall and its gates are locked at night, [and it is therefore according to law of the Torah treated as one domain, and the prohibition against taking out aught from one domain to another is inapplicable there], they would be loading heaps on asses, as also wine, grapes, and figs and all manner of burdens they would bring on a festival; and the market place would be full for all business transactions, the shops standing open and the shopkeepers giving credit, the money-changers sitting before their tables with the golden coins before them, and the workers would rise early to go to their work and hire themselves out for such works [as described above] just as on weekdays, and so on! And since all these matters do not entail m’lachah, they would be permissible on a Yom Tov day and even on Shabbos itself! Therefore the Torah said that [Yom Tov should be a day of] shabbason (solemn rest), meaning that it should be a day of rest and ease, not a day of labor [and weariness]. And so is the lashon of the Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos, Chapter 21, ibid.).