"We have a moral thermostat that ranges from “compassionate” to “cruel.” Rabbi Jack Abramowitz.
"Daniel Penny, a former Marine who choked a fellow subway rider on an uptown F train last year, was acquitted on a charge of criminally negligent homicide on Monday, ending a case that had come to exemplify New York City’s post-pandemic struggles.
The jurors decided that Mr. Penny’s actions were not criminal when he held the rider, Jordan Neely, in a chokehold as the two men struggled on the floor of a subway car on May 1, 2023. Mr. Neely, who was homeless and had a history of mental illness, had strode through the subway car that afternoon, yelling at passengers and frightening them, according to witnesses." New York Times Dec. 10
"Daniel Penny killed Jordan Neely on the F train in New York on May 1, 2023. In case you forgot, Penny put Jordan Neely in a chokehold until Neely died of asphyxiation, on the floor of a subway car, in plain sight. Yesterday, in New York City, Penny was found not guilty of criminally negligent homicide, after the judge had dismissed the more serious charge of manslaughter because of a hung jury. This is America’s war on the homeless, on the mentally ill. R' David Seidenberg.
System of Justice
(יח) שֹׁפְטִ֣ים וְשֹֽׁטְרִ֗ים תִּֽתֶּן־לְךָ֙ בְּכׇל־שְׁעָרֶ֔יךָ אֲשֶׁ֨ר יְהֹוָ֧ה אֱלֹהֶ֛יךָ נֹתֵ֥ן לְךָ֖ לִשְׁבָטֶ֑יךָ וְשָׁפְט֥וּ אֶת־הָעָ֖ם מִשְׁפַּט־צֶֽדֶק׃ (יט) לֹא־תַטֶּ֣ה מִשְׁפָּ֔ט לֹ֥א תַכִּ֖יר פָּנִ֑ים וְלֹא־תִקַּ֣ח שֹׁ֔חַד כִּ֣י הַשֹּׁ֗חַד יְעַוֵּר֙ עֵינֵ֣י חֲכָמִ֔ים וִֽיסַלֵּ֖ף דִּבְרֵ֥י צַדִּיקִֽם׃ (כ) צֶ֥דֶק צֶ֖דֶק תִּרְדֹּ֑ף לְמַ֤עַן תִּֽחְיֶה֙ וְיָרַשְׁתָּ֣ אֶת־הָאָ֔רֶץ אֲשֶׁר־יְהֹוָ֥ה אֱלֹהֶ֖יךָ נֹתֵ֥ן לָֽךְ׃ {ס}
(18) You shall appoint magistrates and officials for your tribes, in all the settlements that your God יהוה is giving you, and they shall govern the people with due justice. (19) You shall not judge unfairly: you shall show no partiality; you shall not take bribes, for bribes blind the eyes of the discerning and upset the plea of the just. (20) Justice, justice shall you pursue, that you may thrive and occupy the land that your God יהוה is giving you.
(יא) עַל־פִּ֨י הַתּוֹרָ֜ה אֲשֶׁ֣ר יוֹר֗וּךָ וְעַל־הַמִּשְׁפָּ֛ט אֲשֶׁר־יֹאמְר֥וּ לְךָ֖ תַּעֲשֶׂ֑ה לֹ֣א תָס֗וּר מִן־הַדָּבָ֛ר אֲשֶׁר־יַגִּ֥ידֽוּ לְךָ֖ יָמִ֥ין וּשְׂמֹֽאל׃
(11) You shall act in accordance with the instructions given you and the ruling handed down to you; you must not deviate from the verdict that they announce to you either to the right or to the left.
(א) אַל תְּהִי צַדִּיק הַרְבֵּה וְאַל תִּתְחַכֵּם יוֹתֵר, אַל תְּהִי צַדִּיק הַרְבֵּה יוֹתֵר מִבּוֹרַאֲךָ, מְדַבֵּר בְּשָׁאוּל, דִּכְתִיב (שמואל א טו, ה): יָצְאָה בַּת קוֹל וְאָמְרָה: אַל תְּהִי צַדִּיק הַרְבֵּה. וְרַבָּנָן אָמְרִין כָּל מִי שֶׁנַּעֲשָׂה רַחְמָן בִּמְקוֹם אַכְזָרִי סוֹף שֶׁמִּדַּת הַדִּין פּוֹגַעַת בּוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (שמואל א לא, ו): וַיָּמָת שָׁאוּל וּשְׁלשֶׁת בָּנָיו.
(1) “Do not be overly righteous, and do not be exceedingly wise; why should you be destroyed?” (Ecclesiastes 7:16) The Rabbis say: Anyone who becomes compassionate when he should be cruel, ultimately, the attribute of justice will harm him, as it is stated: “Saul and his three sons died” (I Samuel 31:6).
Killing Upon Belief of Danger
אָמַר רַב כֹּל דְּאָתֵי עֲלַאי בְּמַחְתַּרְתָּא קָטֵילְנָא לֵיהּ לְבַר מֵרַב חֲנִינָא בַּר שֵׁילָא מַאי טַעְמָא אִילֵּימָא מִשּׁוּם דְּצַדִּיק הוּא הָא קָאָתֵי בְּמַחְתַּרְתָּא אֶלָּא מִשּׁוּם דְּקִים לִי בְּגַוֵּויהּ דִּמְרַחֵם עָלַי כְּרַחֵם אָב עַל הַבֵּן
Rav says: With regard to anyone who breaks into my house, I would kill him, as I would presume that he is ready to kill me, except for Rav Ḥanina bar Sheila, whom I would not kill. The Gemara asks: What is the reason that Rav excludes Rabbi Ḥanina bar Sheila? If we say that Rav trusts him because he is a righteous person, this is difficult, as the case is one where he broke into his house, which indicates that he is not a righteous person. Rather, it is because he would say: I am certain that he would have mercy upon me just like a father would have mercy on a son.
מַתְנִי' הַבָּא בַּמַּחְתֶּרֶת נִידּוֹן עַל שֵׁם סוֹפוֹ הָיָה בָּא בַּמַּחְתֶּרֶת וְשָׁבַר אֶת הֶחָבִית אִם יֵשׁ לוֹ דָּמִים חַיָּיב אִם אֵין לוֹ דָּמִים פָּטוּר
MISHNA: A burglar who is found breaking into a house may be killed by the owner of the house with impunity (see Exodus 22:1). He too is sentenced on account of his ultimate end, as it is presumed that if the owner of the house would resist the burglar, the burglar would kill the owner of the house. If the burglar was breaking into a house, and in the course of doing so he broke a barrel, if there is blood-guiltiness for killing him, i.e., if the homeowner would be liable for killing him, the burglar is liable to pay for the value of the barrel. An example of this is if a father broke into his son’s house, in which case it is presumed that even if the son resists his father, his father would never kill him, and therefore the son may not kill his father, and if he does so he is liable. If there is no blood-guiltiness for killing him, i.e., if the homeowner would be exempt from punishment for killing him, the burglar is exempt from paying for the barrel.
גְּמָ' אָמַר רָבָא מַאי טַעְמָא דְּמַחְתֶּרֶת חֲזָקָה אֵין אָדָם מַעֲמִיד עַצְמוֹ עַל מָמוֹנוֹ וְהַאי מֵימָר אָמַר אִי אָזֵילְנָא קָאֵי לְאַפַּאי וְלָא שָׁבֵיק לִי וְאִי קָאֵי לְאַפַּאי קָטֵילְנָא לֵיהּ וְהַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה אִם בָּא לְהוֹרְגְּךָ הַשְׁכֵּם לְהוֹרְגוֹ
GEMARA: Rava says: What is the reason for this halakha concerning a burglar who breaks into a house? He explains: There is a presumption that a person does not restrain himself when faced with losing his money, and therefore this burglar must have said to himself: If I go in and the owner sees me, he will rise against me and not allow me to steal from him, and if he rises against me, I will kill him. And the Torah stated a principle: If someone comes to kill you, rise and kill him first.
(י) מִי שֶׁנִּגְמַר דִּינוֹ וּבָרַח וּבָא לִפְנֵי אוֹתוֹ בֵית דִּין, אֵין סוֹתְרִים אֶת דִּינוֹ. כָּל מָקוֹם שֶׁיַּעַמְדוּ שְׁנַיִם וְיֹאמְרוּ, מְעִידִין אָנוּ בְאִישׁ פְּלוֹנִי שֶׁנִּגְמַר דִּינוֹ בְּבֵית דִּינוֹ שֶׁל פְּלוֹנִי, וּפְלוֹנִי וּפְלוֹנִי עֵדָיו, הֲרֵי זֶה יֵהָרֵג. סַנְהֶדְרִין נוֹהֶגֶת בָּאָרֶץ וּבְחוּצָה לָאָרֶץ. סַנְהֶדְרִין הַהוֹרֶגֶת אֶחָד בְּשָׁבוּעַ נִקְרֵאת חָבְלָנִית. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה אוֹמֵר, אֶחָד לְשִׁבְעִים שָׁנָה. רַבִּי טַרְפוֹן וְרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא אוֹמְרִים, אִלּוּ הָיִינוּ בַסַּנְהֶדְרִין לֹא נֶהֱרַג אָדָם מֵעוֹלָם. רַבָּן שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן גַּמְלִיאֵל אוֹמֵר, אַף הֵן מַרְבִּין שׁוֹפְכֵי דָמִים בְּיִשְׂרָאֵל:
(10) . . . A Sanhedrin that executes a transgressor once in seven years is characterized as a destructive tribunal. Since the Sanhedrin would subject the testimony to exacting scrutiny, it was extremely rare for a defendant to be executed. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya says: This categorization applies to a Sanhedrin that executes a transgressor once in seventy years. Rabbi Tarfon and Rabbi Akiva say: If we had been members of the Sanhedrin, we would have conducted trials in a manner whereby no person would have ever been executed. Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: In adopting that approach, they too would increase the number of murderers among the Jewish people. The death penalty would lose its deterrent value, as all potential murderers would know that no one is ever executed.
(א) אֶחָד דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת וְאֶחָד דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת, בִּדְרִישָׁה וּבַחֲקִירָה, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר (ויקרא כד) מִשְׁפַּט אֶחָד יִהְיֶה לָכֶם. מַה בֵּין דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת לְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת בִּשְׁלֹשָׁה, וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת בְּעֶשְׂרִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת פּוֹתְחִין בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת פּוֹתְחִין לִזְכוּת וְאֵין פּוֹתְחִין לְחוֹבָה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת מַטִּין עַל פִּי אֶחָד בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, וְדִינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת מַטִּין עַל פִּי אֶחָד לִזְכוּת וְעַל פִּי שְׁנַיִם לְחוֹבָה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת מַחֲזִירִין בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת מַחֲזִירִין לִזְכוּת וְאֵין מַחֲזִירִין לְחוֹבָה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת הַכֹּל מְלַמְּדִין זְכוּת וְחוֹבָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת הַכֹּל מְלַמְּדִין זְכוּת וְאֵין הַכֹּל מְלַמְּדִין חוֹבָה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת הַמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה מְלַמֵּד זְכוּת וְהַמְלַמֵּד זְכוּת מְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת הַמְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה מְלַמֵּד זְכוּת, אֲבָל הַמְלַמֵּד זְכוּת אֵין יָכוֹל לַחֲזֹר וּלְלַמֵּד חוֹבָה. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת דָּנִין בַּיּוֹם וְגוֹמְרִין בַּלַּיְלָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת דָּנִין בַּיּוֹם וְגוֹמְרִין בַּיּוֹם. דִּינֵי מָמוֹנוֹת גּוֹמְרִין בּוֹ בַיּוֹם בֵּין לִזְכוּת בֵּין לְחוֹבָה, דִּינֵי נְפָשׁוֹת גּוֹמְרִין בּוֹ בַיּוֹם לִזְכוּת וּבְיוֹם שֶׁלְּאַחֲרָיו לְחוֹבָה, לְפִיכָךְ אֵין דָּנִין לֹא בְעֶרֶב שַׁבָּת וְלֹא בְעֶרֶב יוֹם טוֹב:
(1) . . . But in cases of capital law, the court directs the judgment based on a majority of one judge to acquit and based on a majority of two judges to find liable. In cases of monetary law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again if new evidence arises, either with a claim to exempt the accused, or with a claim to find him liable. In cases of capital law, the court brings the accused back to be judged again with a claim to acquit him, but the court does not bring him back to be judged with a claim to find him liable. . . . In cases of capital law, all those present at the trial may teach a reason to acquit the accused, but not all present may teach a reason to find him liable. Only the judges can teach a reason to find him liable. . . . In cases of capital law, one who initially teaches a reason to find him liable may then teach a reason to acquit, but one who initially teaches a reason to acquit may not return and teach a reason to find him liable. In cases of monetary law, the court judges during the daytime, and may conclude the deliberations and issue the ruling even at night. In cases of capital law, the court judges during the daytime, and concludes the deliberations and issues the ruling only in the daytime.
From Maimonides: The 293rd prohibition is that we are forbidden from sparing the life of a rodef.
The explanation of this: we said in the previous mitzvah1 that witnesses may not kill someone who has performed a transgression until the High Court has sentenced him to death; but this applies only if he has already performed and completed the transgression that carries the death penalty. However, when he is still involved in trying to perform the act, he is termed a rodef, and we are then obligated to prevent him from doing the sin he has in mind. If he refuses and persists, we must attack him. If we can stop him by [merely] depriving him of use of a limb, such as cutting off his hand or foot, or blinding his eye, that is fine. But if the only way to restrain him is by killing him, he must be killed before he performs the act. In this case, there is a prohibition to have pity on the pursuer by refraining from killing him.
The source of this prohibition is G‑d's statement,2 "You must cut off her hand [if necessary, to save her victim] and not have any pity."
In the words of the Sifri: "The phrase 'You must cut off her hand [if necessary]' teaches that you must save him [even] by cutting off her hand. What is the source of the law that if you cannot save him only through cutting off her hand, then you must kill her in order to save him? From the phrase, 'and not have any pity.' " There [in the Sifri] it also says: "[The reason the Torah uses the example of] 'his private parts' is because [an attack to] his private parts could endanger his life. In this case 'you must cut off her hand.' So too in any case where his life is in danger, 'you must cut off her hand.' "
Our previous statement that the rodef must be killed does not apply to all cases where a person is attempting to do a transgression. It applies only when one is chasing after another trying to kill him, even should [the rodef3] be a child; or trying to commit rape in a case the Torah terms gilui ervah,4 which obviously includes [to rape] another man. [That the law of rodef applies also to rape is derived from] G‑d's statement5 (exalted be He), "Even if the betrothed girl has screamed out, there would have been no one to come and save her." This implies that would there have been someone to save her, that he would do so with any means at his command. The Torah compares the law of an attempted rape of a betrothed girl and an attempted murder in the verse,6 "This is no different from the case where a man rises up against his neighbor and murders him."
The details of this mitzvah are explained in the 8th chapter of tractate Sanhedrin.
ואם אסון יהיה באשה. ונתת נפש תחת נפש. נחלקו רז"ל בזה יש מהם אומרים נפש ממש שהרי רוצח הוא שהרג את האשה ואע"פ שלא נתכוין לה חייב, וי"א ממון שלא נתכוין לה ונתכוין להרוג את זה והרג את זה פטור.
ואם אסון יהיה, “but if a mishap occur,“ to the mother. ונתת נפש תחת נפש, “then you shall award a life for a life.” Our sages (Mechilta) are divided as to the precise meaning of these words. Some hold that they are to be understood literally, i.e. that the guilty party pays with his life, whereas others hold that financial compensation is referred to. The first group of sages consider this an involuntary manslaughter, whereas the second group view it as a classical case of someone wanting to kill A and killing B by mistake when no death penalty applies.